Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/431

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1787.]
FEDERAL CONVENTION.
405

On motion of Mr. WILSON to reconsider article 4, sect. 2, so as to restore "three," in place of "seven," years of citizenship, as a qualification for being elected into the House of Representatives,—

Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 6; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 5.

Monday next was then assigned for the reconsideration; all the states being ay, except Massachusetts and Georgia.

Article 6, sect. 3, was then taken up.

Mr. GORHAM contended that less than a majority in each House should be made a quorum; otherwise, great delay might happen in business, and great inconvenience from the future increase of numbers.

Mr. MERCER was also for less than a majority. So great a number will put it in the power of a few, by seceding at a critical moment to introduce convulsions, and endanger the government. Examples of secession have already happened in some of the states. He was for leaving it to the legislature to fix the quorum, as in Great Britain, where the requisite number is small, and no inconvenience has been experienced.

Col. MASON. This is a valuable and necessary part of the plan. In this extended country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, it would be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number of members of the two Houses to make laws. The Central States could always take care to be on the spot; and, by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or wearying their patience and outstaying them, could carry such measures as they pleased. He admitted that inconveniences might spring from the secession of a small number; but he had also known good produced by an apprehension of it. He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia. He thought the Constitution, as now moulded, was founded on sound principles, and was disposed to put into it extensive powers. At the same time, he wished to guard against abuses as much as possible. If the legislature should be able to reduce the number at all, it might reduce it as low as it pleased, and the United States might be governed by a junto. A majority of the number, which had been agreed on, was so few, that he feared it would be made an objection against the plan.

Mr. KING admitted there might be some danger of giving an advantage to the Central States; but was of opinion that the public inconvenience, on the other side, was more to be dreaded.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to fix the quorum at thirty-three members in the House of Representatives, and fourteen in the Senate. This is a majority of the present number, and will be a bar to the legislature. Fix the number low, and they will generally attend, knowing that advantage may be taken of their absence. The secession of a small number ought not to be suffered to break a quorum. Such events, in the states, may have been of little consequence. In the national councils, they maybe fatal. Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up a quorum, they may seize a moment when a