Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/448

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422
DEBATES IN THE
[August,

not serve in tli3 legislature without a prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best citizens are actuated by such mercenary views, we had better choose a single despot at once It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many. According to the idea of one gentleman, (Mr. Mercer,) our government, it seems, is to be a government of plunder. In that case, it certainly would be prudent to have but one, rather than many, to be employed in it. We cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this system. It will be examined on all sides, and with a very suspicious eye. The people, who have been so lately in arms against Great Britain for their liberties, will not easily give them up. He lamented the evils existing, at present, under our governments, but imputed them to the faults of those in office, not to the people. The misdeeds of the former will produce a critical attention to the opportunities afforded by the new system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands, it is as complete an aristocracy as ever was framed. If great powers should be given to the Senate, we shall be governed in reality by a junto, as has been apprehended. He remarked, that it would be very differently constituted from Congress. In the first place, there will be but Iwo deputies from each state; in Congress there may be seven, and are generally five. In the second place, they are chosen for six years; those of Congress annually. In the third place, they are not subject to recall; those of Congress are. And, finally, in Congress nine states are necessary for all great purposes; here eight persons will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the people will ever agree to such a system? He moved to render the members of the House of Representatives, as well as of the Senate, ineligible, not only during, but for one year after the expiration of, their terms. If it should be thought that this will injure the legislature, by keeping out of it men of abilities, who are willing to serve in other offices, it may be required, as a qualification for other offices, that the candidate shall have served a certain time in the legislature.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. Exclude the officers of the army and navy, and you form a band having a different interest from, and opposed to, the civil power. You stimulate them to despise and reproach those "talking lords who dare not face the foe." Let this spirit be roused at the end of a war, before your troops shall have laid down their arms, and, though the civil authority be "intrenched in parchment to the teeth," they will cut their way to it. He was against rendering the members of the legislature ineligible to offices. He was for rendering them eligible again, after having vacated their seats by accepting office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people choose to give them their confidence? There can be little danger of corruption, either among the people, or the legislatures, who are to be the electors. If they say. We see their merits, we honor the men, we choose to renew our confidence in them,—have they not a right to give them a preference, and can they be properly abridged of it?