quate attack on the part of the British force following up the effect of the explosion ves.sels, the stranded ships were permitted to heave off and thus escaped, for the most part.'
The attack was made on the night of 11 April, but with the exception of one explosion vessel, commanded by Cochrane in person, which shattered the boom in front of the French ships, explosion vessels and fireships alike, timidly, nervously, and ignorantly conducted, were burnt or blown up without doing any damage to the enemy. But the terror of the one had produced the effect which Cochrane anticipated. The French ships cut their cables and attempted to escape, but the water behind was of insufficient depth. At daylight on the morning of the 12th, all but two of them were helplessly aground. But the fireships had all been uselessly expended, and the fleet, which, according to Cochrane's plan, was to have supported the explosion and fire ships, and completed the destruction, was fourteen miles off; nor could Cochrane's signals induce Gambier to make the attempt. In vain did Cochrane signal 'All the enemy's ships except two are on shore;' ' The enemy's ships can be destroyed;' 'Half the fleet can destroy the enemy;' 'The frigates alone can destroy the enemy;' 'The enemy is preparing to heave off.' Gambier tacitly but practically refused to take any measures whatever; he did indeed get the fleet under way, and approach to within about three miles, when he anchored; and in all probability nothing further would have been done had not Cochrane, indignant at seeing the great opportunity wholly lost, let the Impérieuse drift in till she could engage the nearest of the enemy's ships, some of which were still aground, and others had thrown their guns overboard. For very shame, the commander-in-chief was obliged to send in some assistance, and thus four of the enemy's ships were destroyed. Several more might have been, even then; but Lord Gambier peremptorily commanded the assailants to return. The Imperieuse was ordered to England with despatches, and sailed the following morning.
On arriving in England, Cochrane was honoured with the order of the Bath, but he felt deeply how much what had been done fell short of what might and should have been done; and when he was told by Lord Mulgrave that a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier would be proposed in the House of Commons, he replied that in his capacity of member for Westminster he would oppose the motion 'on the ground that the commander-in-chief had not only done nothing to merit a vote of thanks, but had neglected to destroy the French fleet in Aix roads when it was clearly in his power to do so.' To this determination he adhered, despite the entreaties of Lord Mulgrave; and Lord Gambier applied for a court-martial. Cochrane was thereupon, on 29 May, ordered to prefer his charges, which he declined doing, answering that 'the logs and signal log-books of the fleet contained all particulars and furnished premises whence accurate conclusions might be drawn.' He thus had to bear all the odium of having accused his commander-in-chief, without the compensating advantage of being in a position to prove his accusation. Tried by a friendly court, and supported by the whole influence of the admiralty, Lord Gambier was 'most honourably acquitted,' and was thanked by parliament for what, under the most favourable aspect, was a gross error of judgment. The admiralty virtually adjudged Cochrane guilty of falsely libelling his commanding officer on a matter of service. From a naval point of view he was ruined. He submitted a plan for the destruction of the French ships and forts in the Scheldt; the admiralty refused to entertain it. He applied for permission to rejoin his ship, then with the fleet in the North Sea; that also was curtly refused; but several months afterwards, when his speeches in parliament had proved offensive to the admiralty, he was directed to join the Impérieuse without delay and proceed to the Mediterranean. Cochrane declined the service, was therefore placed on half-pay, and for the next three years devoted himself to the exposure of gross abuses in the admiralty. Cochrane's well-justified attack, though it indirectly led to great reforms, created in the first instance much ill-feeling. There were many officials with vested interests eager to do Cochrane an ill turn, and many members of the government, irritated by Cochrane's persistency, who would witness his disgrace without compunction.
Towards the end of 1813 Cochrane's uncle, Sir Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, was appointed to the command-in-chief on the North American station, and went out in a frigate, leaving his flagship, the Tonnant, to be equipped and brought out by his nephew, who was nominated his flag captain. While engaged in fitting out the Tonnant, Cochrane became acquainted with a Captain de Berenger, a French refugee and officer in one of the foreign regiments, who was recommended to him as a skilled rifle instructor and pyrotechnist, in which capacities he was anxious to secure his services for the Tonnant. There is no reason to doubt that De Berenger was fully qualified for this post; but he was
