however, prevented all chance of collision. On 8 March 1688-9 Herbert was appointed first lord of the admiralty; he was also admiral and commander-in-chief of the fleet in the Channel and on the coast of Ireland. On 29 April he sighted the French fleet, and on the evening of the 30th again saw it standing into Bantry Bay. In the morning (1 May) he followed them in. The French admiral, M. de Château-Renault, met him with a greatly superior force; and after a trivial skirmish, Herbert bore up, hoping with more sea-room to be able to outmanoeuvre the enemy. Château-Renault, however, would not risk a close engagement, and towards evening hauled his wind back into the bay, where his transports landed a force of about five thousand men. A week later Château-Renault returned to Brest, and Herbert also went back to Portsmouth to refit. The disproportion of the two fleets made Herbert's success impossible: and as he had only just taken on himself the affairs of the admiralty, he could not be held responsible for the failure. There is, however, no apparent reason for the general satisfaction expressed at the result. The king himself visited the fleet at Portsmouth on 15 June, and soon after created Herbert Earl of Torrington, knighted Captains Ashby and Shovell, and ordered a gratuity to the seamen for their brave behaviour. The engagement must have been made a pretext for rewarding the services rendered to the revolution, and for conciliating the navy. In July the fleet put to sea in adequate force; but the opportunity for the year had passed, and after an uneventful cruise the ships were sent to their several ports for the winter.
Herbert, according to his own statement, which is at once probable and borne out by known facts, complained bitterly of the inefficiency of the fleet, and in conversation with Daniel Finch, second earl of Nottingham [q. v.], the principal secretary of state, urged the necessity of strengthening it. The only reply he could get was, 'You will be strong enough for the French.' He answered, 'I own I am afraid now in winter whilst the danger may be remedied, and you will be afraid in summer when it is past remedy' (Speech to the House of Commons in November 1690, p. 13). Finally, finding remonstrance useless, he obtained permission, as he states, to resign his seat at the board (ib. p. 12). It is certain that he left the admiralty in January 1689-90, and was succeeded by Thomas Herbert, eighth earl of Pembroke [q. v.]; that he remained in command of the fleet; that the fleet was not ready for sea till June; that it was deficient in numbers and badly manned; that the Dutch contingent, on which the Earl of Nottingham had apparently relied, was also much below its stipulated strength; that the government had no intelligence as to the force or movements of the French fleet; that the admiral had no cruisers to supply the want; and that the Dutch, who undertook the duty, did not do it.
The French were thus able to concentrate their whole force without disturbance at Brest, and on 22 June appeared off the Isle of Wight with upwards of one hundred sail, of which 'near if not quite eighty men-of-war were fit to lie in a line.' Herbert, with barely fifty capital ships, was then at St. Helens, and on the news of the French approach got under way, meaning to engage them as soon as possible. It was not till he saw Château-Renault's flag as well as Tourville's, and counted their numbers, that he realised that he had before him the whole force of the French navy, while of the English a large squadron under Admiral Henry Killigrew [q. v.] was at Cadiz, several ships at Plymouth, several to the eastward, and many of the Dutch ships still in their own ports. 'Their great strength and caution,' as he wrote on the 26th, made him anxious to avoid a battle, and his decision was unanimously approved by a council of war, which agreed that in order to do so it would be right to retire, even to the Gun-fleet. He accordingly drew back to the eastward, and was off Beachy Head when, on the evening of the 29th, he received orders from the queen by no means to retire to the Gun-fleet, but to engage the enemy 'upon any advantage of the wind.' The Earl of Nottingham further wrote, repeating the orders to engage, and adding that they had sure intelligence that the enemy had 'not above sixty ships that could stand in a line, and were very ill manned.' Torrington had the evidence of his senses that this was false; he knew that the orders sprang out of the personal jealonsy of Nottingham and of Russell, the latter of whom ought to have been with the fleet in command of the blue squadron, but was in London intriguing against his authority [see Russell, Edward, Earl of Orford]. Still, he felt bound to obey orders, or did not care to give an opportunity to his enemies. He called a council of war, which resolved that if they were to engage, they had better do so at once while they had the advantage of the wind, and accordingly the next morning, 30 June, the allied fleet ran down towards the French. Some scanty reinforcements had raised their numbers to fifty-six, as against the enemy's eighty, but the disparity
