haps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior,[1] this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo,[2] and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.
CHAPTER III.
how a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest.
If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he ought, that we are all sprung from God[3] in an especial manner, and that God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would never have any ignoble mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and if you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we do not so; but since
- ↑ The text is: εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐ χείρων. The sense seems to be: Epictetus is not superior to Socrates, but if he is not worse, that is enough for me. On the different readings of the passage and on the sense see the notes in Schweig.'s edition. The difficulty, if there is any, is in the negative μή.
- ↑ Milo of Croton, a great athlete. The conclusion is the same as in Horace, Epp. i. 1, 28, &c.: “Est quodam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.”
- ↑ Epictetus speaks of God (ὁ θεός) and the gods. Also conformably to the practice of the people, he speaks of God under the name of Zeus. The gods of the people were many, but his God was perhaps one. “Father of men and gods,” says Homer of Zeus; and Virgil says of Jupiter, “Father of gods and king of men.” Salmasius proposed ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. See Schweig.'s note.
