Page:EB1911 - Volume 10.djvu/732

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ATTACK]
FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT
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established it by making it an understood thing that a garrison which surrendered without giving too much trouble after a breach had been opened should have honourable consideration; while if they put the besiegers to the pains of storming the breach, they were liable to be put to the sword.

It has been necessary to dwell at some length on the siegecraft of Vauban and his time, not merely for its historical interest, but because the system he introduced was practically unaltered until the end of the 19th century. The sieges of the Peninsular War were conducted on his Peninsular War. lines; so was that of Antwerp in 1830; and as far as the disposition of siege trenches was concerned, the same system remained in the Crimea, the Franco-German War and the Russo-Turkish War. The sieges in the Napoleonic wars were few, except in the Iberian peninsula. These last differed from those of the Vauban period and the 18th century in this, that instead of being deliberately undertaken with ample means, against fortresses that answered to the requirements of the time, they were attempted with inadequate forces and materials, against out-of-date works. The fortresses that Wellington besieged in Spain had rudimentary outworks, and escarps that could be seen and breached from a distance. At that time, though the power of small arms had increased very slightly since the last century, there had been a distinct improvement in artillery, so that it was possible to breach a visible revetment at ranges from 500 to 1000 yds. Wellington was very badly off for engineers, siege artillery and material. Trench works could only be carried out on a small scale and slowly. Time being usually of great importance, as in the first two sieges of Badajoz, his technical advisers endeavoured to shorten sieges by breaching the escarp from a distance—a new departure—and launching assaults from trenches that had not reached the covered way. Under these circumstances the direct attacks on breaches failed several times, with great loss of life. Wellington in one or two earlier despatches reflected on his engineers for not establishing their batteries on the crest of the glacis. The failures are, however, clearly due to attempts to push sieges to a conclusion without proper preparation.

Fig. 70.—Later Stages of the Attack (Vauban).

So much has been written of late years in criticism of the fortification to what may be called the Vauban period that it is important to note what were the preparations considered necessary for a siege at that time (Journals of Sieges in Spain, 1811 to 1814). Sir John Jones summarizes his own experience in Spain and the data accumulated by practical engineers in former sieges from the time of Vauban onwards, in the following conclusions: The actual work of entrenching, sapping, &c., on the front attacked was much the same whether the fortress contained 5000 or 10,000 men. On the other hand the guard of the trenches was proportionate to the fighting men inside the fortress. (The total number of men had of course to be sufficient to allow three or four complete shifts or “reliefs” for all work and duties.) Adding a proportion of men for camp and other duties, he calculates, for the vigorous siege of an ordinary place situated in open country and containing 5000 men, a corps of 32,080 effectives, and remarks further that this force would be greatly exhausted after a month’s service. The same place held by 10,000 would call for a besieging army of 50,830 men (guards and duties increasing, but not working parties). Thus the besieger should if possible have a superiority of 7 to 1 if the garrison numbered 5000, 6 to 1 if 10,000 and 5 to 1 if 15,000 and so on. As regards artillery, he should have as many, and if possible twice as many, guns as those of the defender on the front of attack, as well as howitzers for sweeping every line subject to enfilade and mortars for destroying traverses, &c. Later in the siege, more howitzers and mortars to clear the covered way and places of arms, and finally, after the covering of the covered way, fifty additional battering guns would be required. It is apparent from this that the practical engineers of the day looked upon a siege as a serious matter, and did not find permanent fortifications wanting in defensive strength.

During the long peace that followed the Napoleonic wars, one advance was made in siegecraft. In England in 1824 successful experiments were carried out in breaching an unseen wall by curved or indirect fire from howitzers. At Antwerp in 1830 the increasing power and range of artillery, and especially of howitzers, were used for bombarding purposes, the Crimea. breaches there being mostly made by mines. Then came one of the world’s great sieges; that of Sevastopol in 1854–1855 (see Crimean War). The outstanding lesson of Sevastopol is the value of an active defence; of going out to meet the besieger, with countertrench and countermine. This lesson has increased in value for us in proportion to the increased power of the rifle.

In comparing the resistance made behind the earthworks of Sevastopol with the recorded defences of permanent works, it is essential to remember that the conditions there were quite abnormal. Sir John Jones has told us what the relative forces of besiegers and besieged should be, and the necessary preponderance of artillery for the attack. The following quotations may be added:

“The siege corps should be sufficiently strong—(1) To invest the fortress completely, and maintain the investment against all the efforts of the garrison. (2) If a regular siege is contemplated, to execute and guard all the siege works required for it. Complete investment may sometimes be impossible, but experience has repeatedly shown that the difficulties of a siege are enormously increased if the garrison are able to draw fresh troops and supplies from outside, and to rid themselves of their sick and wounded.” (Lewis). Again as regards artillery: “In a regular attack, where every point is gained inch by inch, it is impossible to succeed without overpowering the defensive artillery”; and “it is useless to attempt to sap near a place till its artillery fire is subdued ...” (Jones).

These conditions were so far from being fulfilled at Sevastopol that (a) there was no investment—in fact the Russians came nearer to investing the Allies; (b) the Russians had the preponderance in guns almost throughout; (c) the Russian force in and about Sevastopol was numerically superior to that of the Allies. We must add to this that Todleben had been able to get rid of most of his