Page:EB1911 - Volume 15.djvu/100

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84  
ITALY
[1902–1909


however, was in danger of being absorbed by other powers having large African interests; the Anglo-French declaration of the 21st of March 1899 in particular seemed likely to interfere with Italian activity.

The Triple Alliance was maintained and renewed as far as paper documents were concerned (in June 1902 it was reconfirmed for 12 years), but public opinion was no longer so favourably disposed towards it. Austria’s petty persecutions of her Italian subjects in the irredente provinces, her active propaganda incompatible with Italian interests in the Balkans, and the anti-Italian war talk of Austrian military circles, imperilled the relations of the two “allies”; it was remarked, indeed, that the object of the alliance between Austria and Italy was to prevent war between them. Austria had persistently adopted a policy of pin-pricks and aggravating police provocation towards the Italians of the Adriatic Littoral and of the Trentino, while encouraging the Slavonic element in the former and the Germans in the latter. One of the causes of ill-feeling was the university question; the Austrian government had persistently refused to create an Italian university for its Italian subjects, fearing lest it should become a hotbed of “irredentism,” the Italian-speaking students being thus obliged to attend the German-Austrian universities. An attempt at compromise resulted in the institution of an Italian law faculty at Innsbruck, but this aroused the violent hostility of the German students and populace, who gave proof of their superior civilization by an unprovoked attack on the Italians in October 1902. Further acts of violence were committed by the Germans in 1903, which led to anti-Austrian demonstrations in Italy. The worst tumults occurred in November 1904, when Italian students and professors were attacked at Innsbruck without provocation; being outnumbered by a hundred to one the Italians were forced to use their revolvers in self-defence, and several persons were wounded on both sides. Anti-Italian demonstrations occurred periodically also at Vienna, while in Dalmatia and Croatia Italian fishermen and workmen (Italian citizens, not natives) were subject to attacks by gangs of half-savage Croats, which led to frequent diplomatic “incidents.” A further cause of resentment was Austria’s attitude towards the Vatican, inspired by the strong clerical tendencies of the imperial family, and indeed of a large section of the Austrian people. But the most serious point at issue was the Balkan question. Italian public opinion could not view without serious misgivings the active political propaganda which Austria was conducting in Albania. The two governments frequently discussed the situation, but although they had agreed to a self-denying ordinance whereby each bound itself not to occupy any part of Albanian territory, Austria’s declarations and promises were hardly borne out by the activity of her agents in the Balkans. Italy, therefore, instituted a counter-propaganda by means of schools and commercial agencies. The Macedonian troubles of 1903 again brought Austria and Italy into conflict. The acceptance by the powers of the Mürzsteg programme and the appointment of Austrian and Russian financial agents in Macedonia was an advantage for Austria and a set-back for Italy; but the latter scored a success in the appointment of General de Giorgis as commander of the international Macedonian gendarmerie; she also obtained, with the support of Great Britain, France and Russia, the assignment of the partly Albanian district of Monastir to the Italian officers of that corps.

In October 1908 came the bombshell of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, announced to King Victor Emmanuel and to other rulers by autograph letters from the emperor-king. The news caused the most widespread sensation, and public opinion in Italy was greatly agitated at what it regarded as an act of brigandage on the part of Austria, when Signor Tittoni in a speech at Carate Brianza (October 6th) declared that “Italy might await events with serenity, and that these could find her neither unprepared nor isolated.” These words were taken to mean that Italy would receive compensation to restore the balance of power upset in Austria’s favour. When it was found that there was to be no direct compensation for Italy a storm of indignation was aroused against Austria, and also against Signor Tittoni.

On the 29th of October, however, Austria abandoned her military posts in the sandjak of Novibazar, and the frontier between Austria and Turkey, formerly an uncertain one, which left Austria a half-open back door to the Aegean, was now a distinct line of demarcation. Thus the danger of a “pacific penetration” of Macedonia by Austria became more remote. Austria also gave way on another point, renouncing her right to police the Montenegrin coast and to prevent Montenegro from having warships of its own (paragraphs 5, 6 and 11 of art. 29 of the Berlin Treaty) in a note presented to the Italian foreign office on the 12th of April 1909. Italy had developed some important commercial interests in Montenegro, and anything which strengthened the position of that principality was a guarantee against further Austrian encroachments. The harbour works in the Montenegrin port of Antivari, commenced in March 1905 and completed early in 1909, were an Italian concern, and Italy became a party to the agreement for the Danube-Adriatic Railway (June 2, 1908) together with Russia, France and Servia; Italy was to contribute 35,000,000 lire out of a total capital of 100,000,000, and to be represented by four directors out of twelve. But the whole episode was a warning to Italy, and the result was a national movement for security. Credits for the army and navy were voted almost without a dissentient voice; new battleships were laid down, the strength of the army was increased, and the defences of the exposed eastern border were strengthened. It was clear that so long as Austria, bribed by Germany, could act in a way so opposed to Italian interests in the Balkans, the Triple Alliance was a mockery, and Italy could only meet the situation by being prepared for all contingencies.

Bibliography.—It is difficult to indicate in a short space the most important sources of general Italian history. Muratori’s great collection, the Rerum Italicarum scriptores in combination with his Dissertationes, the chronicles and other historical material published by the Archivio Storico Italiano, and the works of detached annalists of whom the Villani are the most notable, take first rank. Next we may mention Muratori’s Annali d’ Italia, together with Guicciardini’s Storia d’ Italia and its modern continuation by Carlo Botta. Among the more recent contributions S. de Sismondi’s Républiques italiennes (Brussels, 1838) and Carlo Troya’s Storia d’ Italia nel medio evo are among the most valuable general works, while the large Storia Politica d’ Italia by various authors, published at Milan, is also important—F. Bertolini, I Barbari; F. Lanzani, Storia dei comuni italiani dalle origini fino al 1313 (1882); C. Cipolla, Storia delle Signorie Italiane dal 1313 al 1530 (1881); A. Cosci, L’ Italia durante le preponderanze straniere, 1530–1789 (1875); A. Franchetti, Storia d’ Italia dal 1789 al 1799; G. de Castro, Storia d’ Italia dal 1789 al 1814 (1881). For the beginnings of Italian history the chief works are T. Hodgkin’s Italy and her Invaders (Oxford, 1892–1899) and P. Villari’s Le Invasioni barbariche (Milan, 1900), both based on original research and sound scholarship. The period from 1494 to modern times is dealt with in various volumes of the Cambridge Modern History, especially in vol. i., “The Renaissance,” which contains valuable bibliographies. Giuseppe Ferrari’s Rivoluzioni d’ Italia (1858) deserves notice as a work of singular vigour, though no great scientific importance, and Cesare Balbo’s Sommario (Florence, 1856) presents the main outlines of the subject with brevity and clearness. For the period of the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars see F. Lemmi’s Le Origini del risorgimento italiano (Milan, 1906); E. Bonnal de Ganges, La Chute d’une république [Venise] (Paris, 1885); D. Carutti, Storia della corte di Savoia durante la rivoluzione e l’ impero francese (2 vols., Turin, 1892); G. de Castro, Storia d’ Italia dal 1797 al 1814 (Milan, 1881); A. Dufourcq, Le Régime jacobin en Italie, 1796–1799 (Paris, 1900); A. Franchetti, Storia d’ Italia dal 1789 al 1799 (Milan, 1878); P. Gaffarel, Bonaparte et les républiques italiennes (1796–1799) (Paris, 1895); R. M. Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy (2 vols., with full bibliography, London, 1904); E. Ramondini, L’ Italia durante la dominazione francese (Naples, 1882); E. Ruth, Geschichte des italienischen Volkes unter der napoleonischen Herrschaft (Leipzig, 1859). For modern times, see Bolton King’s History of Italian Unity (1899) and Bolton King and Thomas Okey’s Italy To-day (1901). With regard to the history of separate provinces it may suffice to notice N. Machiaveili’s Storia fiorentina, B. Corio’s Storia di Milano, G. Capponi’s Storia della repubblica di Firenze (Florence, 1875), P. Villari’s I primi due secoli della storia di Firenze (Florence, 1905), F. Pagano’s Istoria del regno di Napoli (Palermo-Naples, 1832, &c.), P. Romanin’s Storia documentata di Venezia (Venice, 1853), M. Amari’s Musulmani di Sicilia (1854–1875), F. Gregorovius’s Geschichte der Stadt Rom (Stuttgart, 1881), A. von Reumont’s Geschichte der Stadt Rom (Berlin, 1867), L. Cibrario’s Storia della monarchia piemontese (Turin, 1840), and D. Carutti’s