19th of September about 2 m. east of Winchester. Sheridan
had crossed the Opequon and found the enemy in position
Win-
chester. astride the Winchester-Berryville road. Early was outnumbered and outfought, but he attributed his defeat to
the enemy's “ immense superiority in cavalry,” and in
fact Sheridan depicts Merritt's division as charging with sabre
or pistol in hand and literally riding down a hostile battery,
taking 1200 prisoners and 5 guns. The Federal victory,
however, cost Sheridan 4500 casualties and he had hoped for
greater success, since Early had divided his forces. Sheridan's
plan was to overwhelm Ramseur before he could be supported
by Rodes and Gordon, but Early contrived to bring these
divisions up and counter-attack while Sheridan was engaged
with Ramseur. Early had connded his left to Fitz Lee's cavalry
and taken Breckinridge to strengthen his right. But Merritt's
horsemen rode through the Confederate cavalry, who fled,
communicating their panic to the infantry of the left wing,
Fisher's
Hill.
and the day was lost. Early retreated through
Newtown and Strasburg, but at Fisher's Hill behind
Tumbling Run, where the Valley was entrenched on
a front of 3 m. between the Shenandoah river and Little North
Mountain, Early rallied his forces and again detailed his cavalry
to protect his left from a turning movement. But Sheridan
repeated his manoeuvre, and again on the 22nd of September
Early was attacked and routed, General Crook's column having
outflanked him by a détour on the western or Back road. Early
now retreated to Mount Jackson, checked the pursuit at Rode's
Hill, and, evading all Sheridan's efforts to bring him again to
battle, reached Port Republic on the 25th of September. On
learning of this disaster, and the distress of his troops, General
Lee promised to send him boots, arms and ammunition, but
under pressure of Grant's army, he could not spare any troops.
Lee had estimated Sheridan's force at 12,000 effective infantry,
and Early's report as to his being outnumbered by three or
four to one was not credited. Yet Early had much to do to
avoid destruction, for Sheridan had planned to cut off Early
by moving his cavalry up the Luray Valley to Newmarket
while the infantry held him at Fisher's Hill; but Torbert
with the cavalry blundered. Sheridan made Harrisonburg
his headquarters on the 25th of September, where he relieved
Averell of his command for having failed to pursue after the
battle of Fisher's Hill. In the first week of October Sheridan
held a line, across the Valley from Port Republic along North
river to the Back road, and his cavalry had advanced to Waynesboro
to destroy the railroad bridge there, to drive off cattle,
and burn the mills and all forage and bread stuffs. Early had
taken refuge in Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, where he awaited
Rosser's cavalry and KershaW's division (Longstreet's corps),
for Lee had resolved upon again reinforcing the Valley command,
and upon their arrival Early advanced to Mount Crawford and
thence to Newmarket. The Federals retired before him, but
his cavalry was soon to suffer another repulse, for Rosser and
Lomax having followed up Sheridan closely on the 9th of
October with five brigades, the Federal cavalry under Torbert
turned upon this body when it reached Tom's Brook (Fisher's
Hill) and routed it. Sheridan burnt the bridges behind him
as he retired on Winchester, and apparently trusted that Early
would trouble him no more and then he would rejoin Grant at
Petersburg. But Early determined to go north again, though
he had to rely upon Augusta county, south of Harrisonburg,
for supplies, for Sheridan had wasted Rockingham and Shenandoah
counties in accordance with Grant's order. The Union
commander-in-chief, contemplating a longer struggle between
the main armies than he had at first reckoned on, had determined
that the devastation of the Valley should be thorough
and lasting in its effect.
Sheridan at Winchester was now free to detach troops to aid Grant, or remain quiescent covering the Ohio railroad, or move east of Blue Ridge. He had resisted the demand of the government, which Grant had endorsed, that Early should be driven through the Blue Ridge back on Richmond. Sheridan pointed out that guerrilla forces were always in his rear, that he would need to reopen the Alexandria railroad as a line of supply, that he must detach forces to hold the Valley and protect the railroads, and that on nearing Richmond he might be attacked by a column sent out by Lee to aid Early. Yet in fact Sheridan carried out the government programme at the beginning of 1865, and therefore we may assume that his objections in October were not well-founded. Then he was expected to drive Early out of the Valley, but halted at Harrisonburg and, although in superior force, afterwards retired to Winchester, and his boast of having Wasted the Valley seemed ill-timed, since Early was able to follow him down to Strasburg. There was evidently some factor in the case which is not disclosed by Sheridan in his Memoirs.
Early at Newmarket on the 9th of October said that he could
depend on only 6000 muskets if he detached Kershaw, andCedar
Creek.
he had discovered that all positions in the Valley
could be turned, that the open country favoured the
shock tactics of the Federal cavalry, and so placed
his own cavalry at a disadvantage, who, he declared, could not
by dismounted action withstand attacks by superior numbers
with the arme blanche. In these circumstances it would appear
that Early showed great enterprise in following Sheridan down
to Strasburg on the 13th of October “ to thwart his purposes
if he should contemplate moving across the Ridge or sending
troops to Grant.” But as his forward position at Fisher's Hill
could not be long maintained for want of forage, he resolved
to attack Sheridan, and on the night of the 18th of October he
sent three divisions under Gordon to gain the enemy's rear,
while Kershaw's division attacked his left and Wharton's division
and the artillery engaged him in front. The attack was timed
to commence at 5 A.M. on the 19th of October, when Rosser's
cavalry was to engage Sheridan's cavalry and that of Lomax
was to close the Luray Valley. This somewhat complicated
disposition of forces was entirely successful, and Early counted
his gains as 1300 prisoners and 18 guns after routing the Federal
corps VIII. and XIX. and causing Wright's corps (VI.) to retire.
Yet before nightfall Early's force was in turn routed and he lost
23 guns. Early's report is that of a disheartened general.
He complains that his troops took to plundering, that his regimental
officers were incapable; and it is always the Federal
cavalry that cause panic by threatening to charge; he has to
confess that with a whole day before him he could neither complete
his victory nor take up a position for defence, nor even
retreat in good order with the spoils of battle. Sheridan had,
it seems, actually put Wright's corps in march for Petersburg
when news of Early's advance down the Valley reached him;
then he recalled Wright and on the 14th of October was holding
a defensive line along the north bank of Cedar Creek west of the
Valley pike about Middleton. Early had reconnoitred and
withdrawn as far as Fisher's Hill near Strasburg. Sheridan
at this juncture was called to Washington to consult Halleck,
the “ chief of staff,” on the 16th of October in reference to his
future movements: for Halleck claimed to control Sheridan and
often modified Grant's instructions to his subordinate. Before
Sheridan could rejoin his army on the 19th of October Early
had attacked and routed it, but Sheridan met the fugitives and
rallied them with the cry: “ We must face the other way.”
He found Getty's division and the cavalry acting as rear-guard,
and resolved to attack as soon as his troops could be reorganized.
Sheridan was, however, disturbed by reports of Longstreet's
coming by the Front Royal road to cut him off at Winchester,
and hesitated for some hours; but at 4 p.m. he attacked and
drove back the Confederates and so recovered all the ground
lost in the morning, and recaptured his abandoned guns and
baggage.
After the battle of Cedar Creek, Early again retreated south to Newmarket and Sheridan was in no condition to pursue. The Federal government had agreed to Sheridan's proposal to fortify a defensive line at Kernstown and hold it with a detachment while Sheridan rejoined Grant with the main body. On the 11th of November, Early again advanced to reconnoitre at Cedar Creek, but was driven back to Newmarket. At the beginning
