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the early months of the year the crosses indicating ships sunk had been scattered all over the seas W. and S.W. of Ireland. They were now confined to coastal areas, which greatly facili- tated the work of rescue and salvage. From Sept. to Dec. 1917, only six ships were lost over 50 m. from land, which meant a great reduction in casualties, with corresponding increase of confidence in convoyed ships. The homeward-bound convoys were also given what were called ocean escorts of armoured cruisers or armed merchantmen, who accompanied them the whole way. By Sept. 1917, Atlantic convoys were in regular operation with about 150 vessels coming in and the same number going out weekly. The destroyers which took the outward-bound convoy out, met the homeward-bound convoy and brought it in, though this procedure often led to delays and difficulties in bad weather, darkness and fog. The bulk of the Atlantic work in European waters was done by British craft, Great Britain providing 70% of the destroyers for convoy and the United States 27 per cent.

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On the E. coast of Great Britain, matters followed a rather different course. A conference had been held at Longhope (Scapa Flow, Orkneys) on April 4 1917, under the vice-adml. of the Orkneys and Shetland (Sir Frederick Brock), and it had been decided to convoy Scandinavian ships, on whom Great Britain was dependent for much of its imported wood pulp. They came up from Hull to Lerwick, where an escort of two destroyers and four to six trawlers took them across. This route was much more exposed to attack by surface craft than the Atlantic route, for it was only some 350 m. from Horns Reef, a distance which could easily be covered by a fast cruiser in 15 hours of darkness. Such attacks were the natural counterstroke to a convoy system, and it was one of the principal functions of the fleet to screen convoys from them. The first attack of this sort took place on Oct. 17 1917, when the " Brummer " and " Bremse," two fast German cruisers, originally designed as minelayers for the Russian navy, attacked a Scandinavian convoy of 12 ships, and sank the two destroyer escorts, the " Mary Rose " and " Strongbow," and all but three of the convoy. A considerable force of light cruisers (comprising some 16 vessels) was in the vicinity, but as it was not close to the convoy, and the wireless installation of the escorts was destroyed by the first salvo, the enemy got away.

This was a severe blow to the E. coast convoy system and as a remedy it was proposed to provide a stronger covering force from the Grand Fleet. This entailed the reduction of convoys to three a week, the use of the Tyne instead of Humber as an assembly port, and the provision of nine modern destroyers. The commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet demurred at the provision of destroyers, and at a conference on Dec. 10 1917 it was decided to use Methil, a small port on the Fifeshire coast of the Firth of Forth, as an assembly port. The decision had hardly been reached when two clays later, on Dec. 1 2, the convoys were again attacked. The German attack was made on this occasion by two half torpedo flotillas (five boats each). The third half flotilla went N., and meeting heavy weather made Udsire on the Norwegian coast at 7 A.M. on the I3th. Steaming

down the coast, the flotilla sighted at 12:30 P.M. a convoy of six steamers from Lerwick to Norway, escorted by the destroyers " Pellew " and " Partridge " and four armed trawlers. The " Partridge " received a shot in her main steam pipe, and after hitting a German destroyer, Vioo, with a torpedo which did not explode, was sunk. The " Pellew " escaped. The convoy was sunk, and the half flotilla returned home round the Skaw. Two armoured cruisers, the " Shannon " and " Mino- taur," were acting as a covering force, but were again too far off, and though they hurried to the spot on receipt of a wireless message arrived too late. Here can be seen a distinct divergence of opinion and method between the conduct of the Atlantic and Scandinavian convoys. An escort against surface craft should be at least within sight of a convoy, and a covering force against an attack in force is of little use if it is not within reenforcing distance. At the root of the insufficient protection accorded to the Scandinavian convoys was the policy prevailing both at Whitehall and at sea that the Grand Fleet must be ready at any moment to sail for the Bight and bring the enemy to action. This naturally led to convoy work being regarded as an entirely subsidiary task. In April 1918, the German admiral Scheer made a bold sortie in force against the convoy. The whole fleet put to sea on April 23 for the Norwegian coast. In front was Adml. von Hipper with the battle cruisers of the first scouting division, and Scheer followed with the battlefleet. The time was ill-chosen. One convoy of 34 ships was just entering the Forth and another of 47 ships leaving it, while the British 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 7th Light Cruiser Squadron were at sea covering them. This was not the only misfortune for the Germans. The " Moltke " at 8 A.M., about 40 m. S.W. of Stavanger, met with a serious accident and had to be towed home, being torpedoed by 42 on her way back. This was the last sortie of the German fleet, and it is interesting to note that it was directed against the convoy system. It led on the British side to the convoy route being shifted to the northward, so as to remove it farther from the source of attack and increase the chance of striking a counter-blow.

The possibility of an attack by surface raiders in the Atlantic had not been lost sight of. The commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet was kept informed of the approximate position of convoys so as to be in a position to appreciate the situation at once if a raider got out. In Dec. 1917 the two armoured cruisers H.M.S. " Leviathan " and "King Alfred " were attached to convoys, and in 1918 a U.S. pre-dreadnought battleship was added. The possibility of an attack by battle cruisers was met by a U.S. dreadnought force being stationed at Bere Haven in Sept. 1918 to be available to meet convoys coming in, and in Oct. 1918 it actually put to sea for this purpose. Convoy was gradually extended to other routes, and by the end of the war the grand total of ships convoyed reached 88,000, with a loss of 436 ships or approximately 0-5 per cent.

The Mediterranean had always been a difficult area, and the institution of convoys in that sea followed a somewhat different course. Operations in that sea were greatly influenced by the fact that the Mediterranean outside the Adriatic was under French naval control, and the French commander-in-chief, Vice-Adml. Gauchet, would have assumed command in the event of the Austrian fleet breaking out. However, with the con- sent of the French and Italian naval authorities, a British commander-in-chief, Vice-Adml. Sir Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, was appointed in Aug. 1917 with the special charge of arrange- ments for the protection of trade and anti-submarine operations. The divided control, and the different patrol areas under differ- ent nationalities, did not make for efficiency, but the general arrangements were settled by a conference of Allied officers at Malta (Commission de Malte), with delegates from France, Italy and Japan. In the Mediterranean, as at home, the question hinged on destroyers. The Italians preferred to retain their destroyer forces in the Adriatic and on their own coastal routes, just as the British commander-in-chief wanted to retain them with the Grand Fleet. Of the British destroyers available (about 36), some eight were required to watch the Dardanelles