Germans in Arab and African eyes, but though they fought
strong delaying actions with Olsen’s brigade W. and Molitor’s
brigade N. of Tabora they had no intention of holding out to the
last, and in preparation for departure Gen. Wahle employed British,
Indian and African prisoners in building a road towards
Mahenge and established food depots along it. On Sept. 18
Wahle evacuated Tabora, leaving behind about 150 white (German)
soldiers, some sick, some simply war-weary, a number of
civilians (among them Frau Schnee), many prisoners of war and
considerable military stores. The Belgians occupied the town
the next day. Sir Charles Crewe’s column, which, it was hoped,
would have reached the railway line E. of Tabora before the
Germans had time to get away, only struck the line a week later.
Shortly afterwards the column was broken up and Sir Charles
Crewe returned to South Africa. He had, said Gen. Smuts,
“rendered very useful service.” The Wintgens column in its
retreat was engaged by a Belgian detachment at Sikonge, 40 m.
S. of Tabora. Though Wintgens suffered serious loss he made
good his escape. With this action the Belgian campaign of 1916
ended, just at the close of the dry season and at the same time
that Smuts suspended his operations against von Lettow. Gen.
Tombeur’s organization had been thorough and methodical, and
Cols. Olsen and Molitor had proved capable commanders. The
Congo Carrier Corps was disbanded and returned to Uganda.
When the Germans evacuated Tabora the operations conducted by Gen. Northey from the Nyasaland-Rhodesian border had so far developed that some of Northey’s columns were interposed between Tabora and Mahenge. Northey had taken the offensive on May 25 (1916). His fighting Northey’s Campaign force was about 5,000 strong; it was made up of King’s African Rifles (1st battalion), South African troops (infantry), Nyasa and Rhodesian volunteers, the Northern Rhodesian Police (natives under European officers), the British South African Police (Europeans) , and, later, a battalion raised from the natives of northern Rhodesia. For the supplies of this small fighting force the administrations of northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were responsible. Some idea of the effort required is seen from the fact that up to July 1917, out of a total native population of scarcely 2,000,000 in the two districts named, 395,000 were employed as carriers. Much of the supplies had to be carried, in canoe or on foot, fully 600 miles.
Northey’s forces were in two main columns: a Nyasaland column under Maj. (temporary Lt.-Col.) G. M. P. Hawthorn, and a Rhodesian column under Lt.-Col. R. E. Murray. A third column under Lt.-Col. T. A. Rodgers coöperated with Col. Murray. The advance was along the 200 m. front between lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika; there was a great deal of detached fighting, some German commanders, in von Lettow’s opinion, too easily surrendering. Bismarckburg, the German port at the S. end of Tanganyika, was occupied by Col. Murray on June 8. Northey’s main thrust was along the highroad which led from the Nyasa frontier by Neu Langenburg and Iringa to Kilosa on the Central (Tanganyika) railway the road crossing the Tabora-Mahenge route. In an action on July 24 at Malangali Northey defeated the German force which sought to bar his progress, and on Aug. 19 the British seized Lupembe, a place 100 m. W.S.W. of Mahenge. On Aug. 29 Iringa was occupied. Exactly a week earlier Van Deventer had taken Kilosa, 120 m. N.E. of Iringa. Northey could have reached Iringa much earlier, but on Gen. Smuts’s advice he “slowed down.”
When von Lettow had been forced to take to the lower Rufiji district, it was decided that a joint effort should be made by Van Deventer and Northey to deal with the enemy in the Mahenge district. But before that operation could be undertaken Van Deventer’s men were nearly spent after over six months' fighting, marching, privations and illness Northey had to meet the troops of Gen. Wahle coming from Tabora. The Germans were in three columns, an eastern under Maj. von Langenn, a centre column under Wintgens, and a western under Lt. Huebener. Wahle was with the centre column. The western column lost touch with the others, which acted in close coöperation. Northey’s columns near Iringa were much outnumbered. Although Col. Rodgers with a small body of South Africans made an effort to hold up the enemy on the night of Oct. 21 1916 the larger portion of Gen. Wahle’s troops broke through the British lines. An attack made by Maj. Kraut the same day on Mkapira, in the Lupembe region, was regarded by the British as evidence of his knowledge of Wahle’s movements; von Lettow states that this was not the case. The attack on Mkapira ended in a severe reverse to the Germans, but sharp fighting with Wintgens' column continued in the Lupembe area till the middle of Nov., by which time the Germans had occupied a chain of posts covering Mahenge, extending over 200 m., and facing Van Deventer’s and Northey’s troops. Huebener’s column was still W. of Northey’s lines, in the neighbourhood of Lake Rukwa. This was a region where there were neither British nor Belgian troops, and for weeks the British had been doubtful even of the existence of this column. It was eventually tracked down at Ilembule by Col. Hawthorn and bluffed into surrendering. It numbered 54 Europeans and 249 askaris, and the booty included a 4.1-in. howitzer (one of the guns from the “Maria”).
The combined attack by Van Deventer and Northey against the Mahenge force was at length begun, on Dec. 24. The operation failed, though one of Northey’s columns compelled the surrender of Maj. von Grawert and his detachment of 289 fighting men, including 39 Europeans. The main engagement was fought by Van Deventer’s force South African infantry and mounted men. The fight was at Muhanga, 70 m. N.W. of Mahenge. It began on Christmas Day and continued till Dec. 28. The Germans were attacked front and rear, but, as Gen. Smuts wrote, “eventually escaped through the dense bush and forest under cover of darkness and eluded pursuit.” The rains had begun and early in Jan. (1917) the operations had to be abandoned. Gen. Wahle had now under him in the Mahenge area 6,000 or more soldiers, of whom at least 1,000 were Europeans, with a large following of carriers, and he found some difficulty in feeding them all. To relieve the pressure he directed Kraut and Wintgens to take detachments S. towards the Portuguese frontier, and Kraut, crossing Northey’s lines, reached the Rovuma, where supplies were found. Wintgens had separated from him and turned N.W. (see below). All this time communications between Wahle and von Lettow were slow and irregular.
Since the abandonment of the pursuit of von Lettow at the
end of Sept. (1916) Gen. Smuts had been engaged in reorganizing
his army and in shortening lines of communication
by making Dar-es-Salaam his base. He evacuated
2,000 to 15,000 white troops (South Africans), their
British forces reorganized; Changes
in the Command.
place being taken by the Nigerian Brigade (under
Maj.-Gen. F. H. Cunliffe) and new battalions of the
King’s African Rifles. The German ports S. of Dar-es-Salaam
had been occupied by the navy in preparation for a
new offensive. Of these ports the chief were Kilwa and Lindi,
Kilwa being the nearest to Dar-es-Salaam. A considerable force
had been concentrated at Kilwa by mid-Nov., when Gen. Hoskins
took over command in that area. On Jan. 1 1917, in conjunction
with Van Deventer’s and Northey’s operations in the
Mahenge region, Gen. Smuts opened a new offensive against von
Lettow, Hoskins coöperating from Kilwa in the rear of the Germans.
Smuts tried an enveloping movement on the Mgeta river,
but again, after very stout fighting, the enemy got away; they
were followed up towards the Rufiji and engaged on Jan. 4 at
Beho-Beho, in which fight F. C. Selous was killed at the head of
his company of 25th Fusiliers. Though severely handled the
Germans “again slipped past” and crossed the Rufiji at Kibambwe.
The operations continued and were proceeding favourably
to the British until the rains turned much of the valley of the
Rufiji into a vast lake; and in that region, uncomfortably enough,
von Lettow was able to maintain himself.
In the middle of these Jan. operations Gen. Smuts gave up the command. At the request of Gen. Botha he went to England to become a member of the Imperial War Cabinet. Having handed over the command in East Africa to Gen. Hoskins Smuts sailed from Dar-es-Salaam on Jan. 20 for London. Gen. Van Deventer left East Africa at the same time, returning to South Africa.
