sity to load and unload in stations, and even so only in those where there are sidings sufficient to take the military trains so as to leave free the main line during the times of embarking and disembarking. Without this precaution all the traffic will be blocked. Further, when it is a question of loading materiel it is necessary to place it on the platforms. While special platforms or docks are indispensable on the railway, it is always easy, on the road, to find and organize quickly loading-places for lorries; on the railways to install even simple sidings is a serious matter.
Big movements by railway can be made only from a zone A to a zone B, if the two zones A and B are equally rich in loading- places. But apart from those points which come into the initial concentration scheme, and on which therefore work can be done in peace it is impossible to ensure, in the large movements which military operations may necessitate at any given moment, that the beginning and the end of rail transports shall take place in zones that are rich in loading-places.
On the other hand, it is generally possible to find, within a radius of 50 to 100 km. in the zones A and B under consideration, one or more regions rich in loading-places. The normal combination consists therefore in utilizing motor transport to prolong railway transport, and to carry the troops or materiel (i) from their stationary zone to the places of embarkation, and (2) from their places of disembarkation to the zone of operations. The relatively short movements (50 to 100 km.) it requires are those in which the efficiency of the lorry is at its greatest. And between the two zones of loading thus actually used, the efficiency of the railway will equally be a maximum.
Examples of combined use of rail and road systems were very frequent in the course of the war. In Oct. 1914 all French troops despatched for the Ypres region were carried by rail to the region N.E. of Arras (Doullens, St. Pol, Bethune, Bailleul) and pushed forward from there by automobile to Ypres. Similar arrange- ments were made on every occasion in the course of the war on which the French army was called upon to put considerable forces into this region. For example, in April 1918, in the movement of reinforcements to Flanders, the French employed three routes gardees, by which, though they cut through the lines of communi- cation of the British armies, formations picked up at the railway stations of disembarkation around Amiens and Arras were des- patched to the Ypres region.
Naturally, other combinations are also practicable: for exam- ple, that by which, on Nov. 20-21 1917, 3 French divisions were to be carried from Meaux and Chateau-Thierry to Peronne; the infantry, with their machine-guns and cooking-carts, being con- veyed in motor lorries, and the artillery by train. The object of these movements, very quickly ordered on Nov. 19, was to reinforce the successful British attack in front of Cambrai with the first use of tanks in mass, and had overwhelming results. While the embarkation of the artillery was proceeding at railway stations in proximity to the divisional billets on the Marne, the C.R.A. of Meaux and Chateau-Thierry loaded up on 3,000 lor- ries the infantry, etc., of the 3 divisions. The movements of the lorries, made by 3 separate itineraries, came to an end in the neighbourhood of Peronne, where a C.R.A. of disembarkation put the various elements in their places in the zone where the 3 divisions were re-forming. At the same time the British motor service was working with full efficiency on all the routes converging from the N. and W. on this same region of Peronne. In every case there must be the closest liaison between the au- thorities who regulate the movements of the trains on the rail- ways and those who regulate the movements of motors on the roads. In the case where troops are loaded into lorries on leaving a train, it is necessary that the motor transport should be con- stantly informed by the rail-transport authorities of the hours of arrival arranged for the trains, in order to have the lorries at the disembarkation platforms in good time for immediate loading-up of the troops. Finally, as in the case of the move to Peronne, where there were parallel moves by rail and roads, there must be a complete understanding between all concerned, so that, both in the zone of departure and in the zone of arrival, the hours of embarking and disembarking should be so arranged as to avoid
crossings of columns and overcrowding; and the working-up and reconstitution of higher formations, whose elements are conveyed partly by rail, partly by lorry, partly again by marching, must be minutely worked out and definitely fixed. A final example may be given of the combined use of the automobile and railway. In this instance it is required to make a rapid movement of certain troops to a zone where, for some reason, it is not possible to use the railway system. Here, combination is needed in the disem- barkation and reembarkation arrangements at the beginning and the end of the zone; such operations are easy where the two organizing departments of the railways and automobiles are directed by the same superior authority and kept in strict and constant touch. If, after Oct. 1918, the pursuit of the German armies had not been arrested by the Armistice, this problem would have had a thoroughly practical demonstration, for it is probable that the Allies would have been able to take into use the railways existing beyond the devastated zone. In Nov. 1917, at the time of the crossing of the Alps by a portion of the French troops, the C.R.A. of Besanjon and of Nice had to deal with an analogous case; viz. to set in motion and to transport over the passes of the Alps those troops which, having been disembarked from the French railways at the foot of the mountains, were to be reloaded on the Italian railways on the other side.
It must be observed that there are many details which compli- cate considerably the task of the transport officials: such as the question of food supply for the troops during their transportation and at their disembarkation, and the question of moving troops simultaneously with the building-up of the munition dumps which they will require. One last remark should be made: trans- portation by automobile and by railway, which, we have seen, supplement one another happily in regard to distance, is equally satisfactory in regard to time. Large movements by railway require a concentration of materiel, often difficult to achieve; and, in the case of moves decided on in a hurry, the possibility of motor transports on a large scale assumes very great importance, since it takes 4 or 5 days for the railway to show its full powers.
Conclusion. The experience of the war shows the role which transport by motors is called upon to sustain becoming more and more important. The Allied armies, together, placed on the French front about 20,000 vehicles of motor propulsion in Oct. 1914; four years later the number exceeded 200,000.
As regards troop transport alone, the power conferred on the command by the employment of lorries had grown enormously during this period of four years. At the time of the Armistice, the inter-Allied transports reserve, the creation of which had just been decided on, was of a size to transport simultaneously 10 divisions of infantry complete, with all their means of fighting, machine-guns and artillery included. This was a fighting mass of more than 100,000 men, which the Higher Command was able to pick up at short notice and carry at the speed of 100 km. a day to any point where it was required.
As regards the transport of materiel at the end of the war, it had become possible independently of the resources just men- tioned to keep supplied with food and munitions 40 divisions at a distance of 100 km. from the railways.
To show what was actually achieved in those directions, it will be enough to say that, in the French army alone, there were carried by motor transport during July 1918 1,040,000 tons of materiel and 950,000 combatants.
In the future it is to be foreseen that mechanical motive power will replace entirely the animal motive power in the armies. Since the use of special tractors enables the artillery to take up positions in any kind of terrain, there will be no reason for no giving it, on the road, the speed of moving which the automobile allows. And as the support of infantry on the battlefield, i.e. accompanying guns and also tanks, will in the future be capabli of rapid movement on the roads, it will be natural to organiz more and more systematically the rapid conveyance by automo- bile of considerable masses of infantry. The evolution of strategy must always be in the direction of using all available means surprise and break the enemy by concentrating unexpecte strength with unexpected rapidity. (A. D.*)
