developed, high-grade steel industry. What Krupp and Ehrhardt were to Germany, the Skoda works and the firm of Bohler were to Austria-Hungary; and eventually the Hungarian gun factory at Gyor, which was under the management of Skoda, was added to these. For small arms and rifles Austria-Hungary possessed, in the front rank, the Steyr armament works. All these private sources of production in conjunction with the State factories which, since the time of Uchatius, had been capable of a large output, were soon in a condition to undertake the entire supply of the Austro-Hungarian army, and also to share in the equip- ment of her weaker allies with guns, small arms and shells.
The chemical industry was, however, totally inadequate, so that in this respect the Danube monarchy was very largely dependent upon Germany, and consequently had difficulty in producing the necessary explosives in sufficient quantity. In fact, the inadequacy of the powder and explosive production of Austria-Hungary made itself felt all through the war, and was the main cause of the crises which occurred from time to time in the munitions supply. The truth is that neither of the Central Powers was at first equipped for coping with the unex- pectedly great and urgent demand for munitions, any more than were the rest of the belligerents.
The difficulties created in Germany by the blockade were increased by Austria-Hungary's lack of raw materials, which rendered her almost powerless to offer any compensation for the loss of overseas imports. Only after Gorlice (May 1915) did her petroleum industry begin to contribute to the common war economy, and besides this, strictly speaking, only her bauxite deposits, magnesium works and timber stocks were worthy of mention beside Germany's extensive contribution.
Nevertheless, Germany succeeded in carrying on the war, which was so largely one of materials, for 4^ years, and Austria- Hungary's contribution of material (for example, of guns and ammunition) was for a long time in the proportion of 1:3 to that of Germany. These facts afford a proof of the remarkable way in which Germany adapted herself to the war necessities, and also of the height of her technical accomplishment; they are no less a sign of the immense vitality of the Dual Monarchy, which was contrary to all expectation even in Austria-Hungary itself. The achievement of the much weaker Austro-Hungarian industries is perhaps the greater marvel, for the difficulties of obtaining raw materials, of finding the necessary workmen, the transport problem, and, lastly, the very different degrees of development in the various regions weighed heavily indeed. Both the Central Powers achieved seeming impossibilities in utilizing the entire productive capacity of their populations, the more so as all active classes of the people were called up during the war, as in the other belligerent States.
The actual organization of production is dealt with later in this article. Before coming to it, we will describe generally the character of the problem to be faced in respect of the forms of munitions employed by the Central Powers.
Artillery Ammunition. The two empires had always been entirely independent of one another as regards the development of the whole artillery, small arms, machine-gun, and ammunition production. Only in course of the war did an active interchange of field and factory experience take place. Bulgaria and Turkey, until the war, competed for their weapons in the open market.
The shell, as the shooting agent, is so entirely dependent struc- turally upon the shooting apparatus, that ammunition can only be dealt with in relation to the guns concerned. The ruling considera- tion in the manufacture of guns must likewise be their conformity with the possibilities of shell construction.
The Central Powers like the French on their introduction of the 75-mm. field-gun, which was believed capable of satisfying all re- quirements endeavoured to unify the artillery weapons of the field army as much as possible ; that is, to make one type of gun suffice. However, opinion soon came round to the view the correct one, as the war showed that both the light and the medium field- artillery required a high-angle gun. In Austria, particularly, where the mountainous nature of the country had led before the war to the production of conspicuously good high-angle guns and notably mountain guns, the view was held that even the Tight artillery must have shells of great penetrating power for vertical fire against the covered-in shelters and stone defences to be looked for in moun- tain warfare. In both the Central Empires judgment went against the artillery experts who were in favour of greater mobility and light-
er ammunition. However, both armies possessed a medium artillery (up to and including 15 cm.) which was highly effective as regards the individual round. At the beginning of the war Germany already had modern light and heavy howitzers, and also the 2 1 -cm. mortar. It is true that the Austro-Hungarian medium artillery was only equipped with the new patterns after the first few months of the war, the tests being then barely completed ; the existing types of howitzer were, however, not inferior, either in shooting effectiveness or in the matter of shells. While the Austro-Hungarian super-heavy how- itzers were undoubtedly superior in mobility and effectiveness to that of all the other armies, the German medium and heavy flat- trajectory artillery were immensely superior.
The weapons referred to are the 3O-5-cm. mortar (38o-kgm. shell;
11 kilometres' range), and the 42-cm. howitzer (l.ooo-kgm. shell;
12 kilometres' range) of Austria-Hungary, already existing in peace time, to which the38-cm. howitzer and the 21 -cm. mortar were added during the war. All three were designed for motor traction. The German long-range gun is also included. At the beginning of the war Germany had also her 42-cm. howitzer, which, however, was inferior in mobility to the Austrian.
The different lines of development of the German and Austrian artillery were determined by the form of their respective main theatres of war. Austria-Hungary, which had to adapt its artillery to the destruction of the enemy forts distributed through all the important mountain passes and the rocky shelters to be found in the hills, clearly had to make her gun and ammunition construction cor- respond to this necessity. There was thus more urgent need for shells with solid points, and therefore base-fuzes.
Reviewing the technical triumphs of the World War, it is clear that in the domain of artillery ammunition there was no advance gas ammunition excepted on the pre-war principles of construc- tion. This applies to all the belligerents. In spite of the efforts at uniformity, the munitions equipment necessarily became very varied during the war, because it had to conform to the varied character of the fighting, of the ground, and, lastly, of the production, which was subject to the supply of raw material and to the capacity of the factories. However, the new products were almost always construct- ed on the old lines, and all new types which resulted from lack of the customary material appear, when closely examined, as no more than forced solutions of a difficulty. The ammunition, like the gun material, remained unchanged in principle, only tending towards a gradual intensification, without any change in essential character. No new propellant, no new explosive, no new body or driving-band material, not even a really new and better fuze, emerged from this unparalleled trial of strength, this world-wide competition in tech- nical ability. In two directions only may real improvement be noted : the false-cup shell which increased range and brought up fresh ballistic problems in connexion with the upper air, and the shell of the Austrian 30-5 motor-mortar, which was the first high-trajec- tory projectile combining armour-piercing effect with mine-effect. This latter shell was the product of the very developed native high- grade steel industry. With an explosive charge of 38 kilogrammes, it had (like the mine-shells of the field howitzers) a 10 % efficiency (proportion of explosive to total weight), and yet, with an initial velocity of about 300 metres a second, was able to penetrate 250 millimetres of reinforced nickel-steel armour without deformation. This necessitated a resisting capacity, taking pressure alone, equal to 21,600 kilogrammes to the square centimetre, and it was not a thick naval shell, but a thin-walled mine-shell, of which the point and shoulders had to be hardened. The material was a specially reinforced alloy of high-grade steel. The results obtained with this in peace-time had already induced the German army chiefs to place orders with Austrian works for shells for their 2i-cm. mortars.
Developments in Manufacture. In the case of guns and of ammu- nition alike, the war-developments in manufacture were of an industrial nature in both the Central Empires. The military author- ities exercised an influence over this development through the orders they placed and the experiments they caused to be made.
In Austria-Hungary there was a special Artillery Staff, the officers of which were recruited, like those of the General Staff, from the General Staff School, and received, in addition, a special technical training. For this reason, and also because it was in constant touch with the troops, this corps was able to judge, from both a military and a technical standpoint, what demands should and could be made for any kind of military material. The ammunition with the exception of special types, as, for example, the Ehrhardt " Universal " shell was actually designed in the military bureaus of this staff. Hence the Austrian ammunition was from the beginning more uni- form in construction, and the work done by the staff in peace-time considerably lightened the task of transforming the artillery equipment which, excepting the field-guns and the heaviest high- trajectory guns, was not modern.
Projectiles^: Material and Methods of Production. The cores of modern artillery projectiles were made from Martin steel by the Ehrhardt pressure process. A material rich in manganese was de- sirable, and especially one which should be reasonably workable and not liable to cause much waste from rejections. This process of manufacture by means of shell-presses, and, for larger; calibres, by drawing from rough billets of metal, required special establishments. The production was therefore confined to specially adapted factories.
