that the property of each partner was not liable, in security, to a greater amount than the sum he had subscribed. This exempted the banks from the natural inconveniences that might be occasioned by the insolvencies and elopements of members. Money was accumulated in great abundance, as they bought property; lent on security; and became rich. But their credit was of short duration. When it was found, that a few of them could not redeem their bills, the faith of the people was shaken. A run on the paper shops commenced; and a suspension of specie payments soon became general. Had the people been at liberty to recover a composition, as in the bankrupt concerns of Britain, the evil might have, in some measure, been remedied before this time; but chartered privileges granted by legislators concerned in the fraud, prevented legal recourse. Even these could not have been sufficient protection, but for the co-operation of subsequent laws dictated by the same interest. The state of Indiana, for example, passed in 1818, what was called "the replevy law," liberating the debtor for a year from the claim of the creditor, who refuses to accept depreciated money. This {194} law, though sufficiently injurious to creditors, could give no stability to swindling banks. It was, therefore, succeeded by an act during last session, prohibiting landed property to be sold by execution, under two-thirds of the appraised value, and that to be ascertained by five freeholders. The debtor is by the same act allowed to set apart any portion of his property he chooses, to discharge execution. Freeholders, it may be observed, are a class of men naturally adverse to depreciating their own land, by setting a low value on that of their neighbours. This disposition is the more dangerous at present, especially when lands are falling considerably in price, in conse-
