LOGIC 781 reasons, indeed, may be advanced for holding that logic is entirely to be separated from psychology, as differing from it in aim, method, and principle, that logical analysis is generically distinct from psychological, and that the two disciplines, while connected as parts of the general body of philosophical reflexion, hold to one another a relation the reverse of that commonly accepted. 1 As to the endeavour to collect from consideration of the sciences in detail a body of precepts, the rules of scientific method, and to assign the systematic arrangement of such rules to one special discipline, called logic, it seems to stand on the same footing and to be open to the same criticism as the allied attempt to treat general philosophy as the receptacle for the most abstract propositions reached in scientific knowledge. There is a peculiar assumption underlying the supposed possibility of distinguishing between scientific method and its concrete exemplifications in the special sciences, and only on the ground of this assumption could there be rested the independence of logic as the systematic treatment of method. It is taken for granted, without examination, that the characteristic features of correct and well-founded thinking are palpable and general, and that we thus possess a criterion for marking off what is common to all scientific procedure from that which is special and peculiar to the individual sciences. An elaborate philosophic doctrine lies at the root of this assumption, and the position assigned to logic may easily be seen to depend, not on what is apparent in the argument, namely, comparison of the sciences with one another, but on what lies implicit in the background, the philosophic concep tion of the nature of scientific knowledge in general. Without reference to the ultimate philosophic view, no definite con tent could be assigned to logic, and it would remain impossible to distinguish logic from the sciences in detail. 2 3. Thus the various attempts to define the province and functions of logic from general classification of the sciences, to define, in short, by the method of division, yield no satisfactory answer, and refer ultimately to the philosophic view on which classification and division must be based. A similar result becomes apparent when we consider the various descriptions of logic that have been presented as following from more precise and accurate determination of the essential features of logical analysis and method. " The philosophical deduction or construction of the notion of logic presupposes a comprehensive and well- grounded view, whether of the nature and mode of opera tion of the human mind, a definite part of which falls under logical treatment, or of the problems and objects of philosophy in general, from among which in due order may be distinguished the particular problem of logic." 3 The most elementary distinctions, by means of which, in the ordinary exposition of logic, progress is effected towards an accurate determination of the province of the science, not only refer to some such ultimate philosophic view, but lead to the most diverse results, according to the peculiarity of the views on which they are based. Of these elementary distinctions the following are at once the more usual and the more important : the distinction between the province of logic and the province of the special sciences, as that between general and special ; the distinction between 1 It is to be acknowledged that most of the writers on logic who emphasize the connexion of psychology with logic introduce distinctions equivalent to the remarks above made, but the grounds for such dis tinctions and the conclusions to be deduced from them are not generally brought into clear light. 8 See, for a clear statement of this impossibility, Comte, Philos. Positive, i. 34, 35. Definitions of logic as theory of method, which are based on general philosophic views (e.g., the definition by Sigwart, Logik, i. 1), stand on a different footing, and are to be examined on different principles. 3 Twesten, Die Logik, insbcsondere die Analytik (1825), p. 2. natural growth of knowledge, with its natural laws, and the normal procedure whereby grounded knowledge is obtained, with its normal or regulative principles; the distinction between knowledge as a whole and its several parts, immediate and mediate, with restriction of logic to the treatment of all or portion of mediate knowledge ; the dis tinction between the constituents of knowledge as on the one hand given from without (in experience), and on the other hand due to the elaborative action of intellect itself. To one or other of these may be traced the common definitions of logic, and a brief consideration of their contents will be sufficient to show that they severally rest upon more or less developed general philosophic doctrines, and that their significance for accurate determination of the field of logic depends not so much on what is explicitly stated in them as on what is implied in the general doctrines from which they have taken their rise. The distinction of logic from the sciences, as dealing in the abstract with that which is concretely exemplified in each of them, is certainly a first step in the process of deter mination about which there can be little or no doubt. But if the distinction remain vague, it is not sufficient to differentiate logic from many other disciplines, philosophical or philological, and if it be made more precise, the new characteristics will be found to involve some special view as to what constitutes the common feature in the sciences, and to vary with the possible varieties of view. As a rule, too, the added characteristics do not serve by themselves to mark off logical treatment as an independent kind of investigation. They are most frequently obtained by a general survey of scientific procedure. Thus it may be said that in all sciences there are implied clearly defined notions, general statements or judgments, and methodical proofs ; logic therefore, as the theory of the general element in science, will appear as the treatment of notions, judg ments, and proofs generally, or in the abstract. If so, then, unless some implied principle further determine the course of procedure, logic would be regarded as a merely descriptive account of the parts making up scientific know ledge, and it would be not only impossible to assign to it an independent position, but hard to discriminate it from psychology, which likewise deals with the parts of knowledge. If it be understood, however, or explicitly stated, that in all scientific knowledge there is community of method, resting on common principles or laws of know ledge as such, then clearly not only the province of logic, as now made identical with the treatment of the essence of knowledge, but the special nature of the theorems making up the body of logic, must depend upon the general conception of knowledge with which the thinker starts. In the view of logic taken, e.g., by Mill, the fuadamental idea is that of evidence, under which must be included all the grounds for any judgment not resting on immediate perception. So far as verbal statement is concerned, the adoption of this as the root idea would not distinguish in any special way the treatment of logical problems resting on it, but in fact each problem is dealt with in accordance with the particular theory of what, from the nature of human knowledge, constitutes evidence. Logic thus in volves, or in truth becomes, a theory of knowledge, and in the end, for general spirit and details of doctrine, refers to an ultimate philosophic view. There seems no escape from this conclusion. Start as we may, with popular, current distinctions, no sooner do logical problems present them selves than it becomes apparent that, for adequate treatment of them, reference to the principles of ultimate philosophy is requisite, and logic, as the systematic handling of such problems, ceases to be an independent discipline, and becomes a subordinate special branch of general philosophy. The attempt to avoid this conclusion must of necessity
