208 NAPOLEON [1804- volutionary party in France would applaud a new tragedy like that of January 1793. (Accordingly Bernadotte and Curee were delighted with it.) That the Due d Enghien was innocent of the conspiracy was nothing to the purpose ; the act was political, not judicial ; accordingly he was not even charged with complicity. That the execution would strike horror into the cabinets, and perhaps bring about a new Coalition, belonged to a class of considerations which at this time Bonaparte systematically disregarded. This affair led immediately to the thought of giving heredity to Bonaparte s power. The thought seems to have commended itself irresistibly even to strong republicans and to those who were most shocked by the murder. To make Bonaparte s position more secure seemed the only way of averting a new Reign of Terror or new convulsions. He himself felt some embarrassment. Like Cromwell, he was afraid of the republicanism of the army, and heredity pure and simple brought him face to face with the question of divorcing Josephine. To propitiate the army he chose from the titles suggested to him consul, stadtholder, &c. The that of emperor, undoubtedly the most accurate, and emperor having a sufficiently military sound. The other difficulty, Napoleon. a ft e r much furious dissension among the two families of Bonaparte and Beauharnais, was evaded by giving Napo leon himself (but none of his successors) a power of adop tion, and fixing the succession, in default of a direct heir natural or adoptive, first in Joseph and his descendants, then in Louis and his descendants. Except abstaining from the regal title, no attempt was made to conceal the abolition of republicanism. Bonaparte was to be called Napoleon, and "sire" and " majeste^"; grand dignitaries with grand titles were appointed ; and " citoyen " from this time gave way to "monsieur." The change was made by the con stituent power of the Senate, and the senatus-consulte is dated May 18, 1804. Tt required some impudence to condemn Moreau for royalism at the very moment that his rival was re-establish ing monarchy. Yet his trial began on May 15th. The death of Pichegru, nominally by suicide, on April 6th had already furnished the rising sultanism with its first dark mystery. Moreau was condemned to two years imprison ment, but was allowed to retire to the United States. These changes destroyed all that remained of the political life of France. Jacobinism had been eradicated in Nivose ; republicanism and royalism were paralysed now. Hence forth there was no power or person in France but Bona parte, and over Europe there hung a danger more terrible than had ever threatened it before. The combined resources of several countries and an unparalleled military force were at the absolute disposal of a general and administrator of commanding ability, who had shown by the manner of his rupture with England that he was bent upon undertaking vast military enterprises. This danger, which was clearly visible early in 1804, could not be averted. His scheme indeed failed. He did not conquer England, nor recover Malta and reoccupy Egypt. His forces were drawn in another direction. But, if England suffered less, Europe suffered far more than could have been feared in 1804. The wars which now begin are not, like those of the French Revolution, wars of principle, for the principles of the Revolution have been recanted and are held by no one in so much contempt as by Bonaparte. Nor are they armed litigations like the old wars of Europe, but unique experiments in which millions of lives are sacrificed to the ambition of an individual. Throughout 1804 and the first part of 1805 the policy of Bonaparte is such as might be called insane, if he had had the ordinary objects of a ruler ; it is explained by the consideration that he wants war, even if it should be war with all the world. He had acted in a similar way in 1798. In thinking that he should profit by war he was not mis- Designs taken. Had he only gone to war with the whole Continent against at once, he would not, as the event proved, have overesti- En S 1 and mated his strength. But he was not, in the long run, a match Oo^. for England and the Continent together; he made at starting nent. the irremediable mistake of not dividing these two enemies. He seems indeed to have set out with a monstrous miscal culation which might have ruined him very speedily, for he had laid his plan for an invasion of England and a war in Europe at the same time. If we imagine the invasion suc cessfully begun, we see France thrown back into the position of 1799, her best general and army cut off from her by the sea, while Austria, Russia, and perhaps Prussia pour their armies across the Rhine; but we see that the position would have been far worse than in 1799, since France without Bonaparte in 1805 would have been wholly par alysed. As it was, the signal failure of his English enter prise left room for a triumphant campaign in Germany, and Ulm concealed Trafalgar from the view of the Continent. The European Coalition had been disarmed since Brumaire by the belief that Bonaparte s Government was less intolerably aggressive than that of the Directory; this belief gave place in 1803 to a conviction that he was quite as aggressive and much more dangerous. England therefore might hope to revive the Coalition, and in the spring of 1804 she recalled Pitt to the helm in order that he might do this. The violent proceedings of Bonaparte on the occasion of the rupture, his occupation of Hanover, his persecution of the English representatives in Germany, Spencer Smith at Stuttgart, Drake at Munich, Sir G. Rumbold at Hamburg, created an alarm in the cabinets greater than that of 1798, and the murder of D Enghien shocked as much as it alarmed them. Positive conquest and annexation of territory too now went on as rapidly and as openly as in 1798. The new empire compared itself to that of Charlemagne, which extended over Italy and Germany, and on December 2, 1804, a parody of the famous transference of the empire took place in Notre Dame, the pope (Pius VII.) appearing there to crown Napoleon Napoleon, who, however, took the crown from his hands crowned, and placed it himself upon his own head. Meanwhile the Italian republic was changed into a kingdom, which at first Bonaparte intended to give to his brother Joseph, but in the end accepted for himself. In the first months of 1805, fresh from the sacre in Notre Dame, he visited Italy and received the iron crown of the Lombard kings at Milan. Soon after the Ligurian republic was annexed, and a principality was found for his brother-in-law Bacciochi in Lucca and Piombino. By these acts he seemed to show himself not only ready but eager to fight with all Europe at once. It was not his fault that in the autumn of 1805, when he fought with Austria and Russia in Germany, he was not also maintaining a desperate struggle in the heart of England ; it was not his fault that Prussia was not also at war with him, for his aggressions had driven Prussia almost to despair, and only once that is, in the matter of Sir G. Rumbold had he shown the smallest consideration for her. And yet at first fortune did not seem to favour him. Had public opinion been less enslaved in France, had the frivolity of the nation been less skilfully amused by the operatic exhibitions of the new court and the sacre in Notre Dame, it would have been remarked that, after most needlessly involving France in war with England, Bonaparte had suffered half the year 1803, all the year 1804, and again more than half the year 1805 to pass without strik ing a single blow, that after the most gigantic and costly preparations the scheme of invasion was given up, and that finally France suffered a crushing defeat at Trafalgar which paralysed her on the side of England for the rest of
