214 NAPOLEON [1808- liberalism of Europe, he proclaimed the abolition of the Inquisition and of feudalism, and the reduction of the number of convents to one-third. He remained in Spain till the middle of January 1809, but he was not allowed repose during the interval. Sir John Moore had advanced from Portugal as far as Salamanca, and determined in the middle of December to assist the insurrection by marching on Valladolid. Soult was at Carrion and was threatened by this advance, since the English force, after Moore had effected his junction with Baird, who arrived from Corunna, at Majorga, amounted to 25,000 men. Napoleon hoped to cut its communications, and so deal one of his crushing blows at the enemy with whom he was always at war yet whom he never, except at Waterloo, met in the field. He set out on the 22d with about 40,000 men, and marched 200 miles in ten days over mountains in the middle of winter. Moore saw the danger, retired to Benavente, and blew up the bridges over the Ezla. Napoleon advanced as far as Astorga ; but he had missed his mark, and professed to receive information which showed him that he was urgently wanted at Paris. He returned to Valladolid, whence on January 19th he set out for France. The end of Moore s expedition belongs to English history. First Ger- Another storm was indeed gathering. The down- man War f a u O f Austria in 1805 had been out of all proportion of Libera- j. Q j^ military inferiority ; it was impossible that she should acquiesce in it. The year that followed Tilsit had given her quite a new prospect. Spain, which before had given Napoleon help, now swallowed up 300,000 of his troops, so that in the autumn of 1808 he had been obliged to withdraw from Prussia the large army which he had kept for more than a year quartered on that unhappy country. Napoleon could now spare only half his force, and there was now no doubt that Prussia would be as hostile to him as she dared. True, the army of Frederick had ceased to exist, but the country was full of soldiers who had belonged to it, full of skilled officers, and Spain had filled all minds with the thought of popular war. Stein and Scharnhorst had been preparing a levee en masse in Prussia and an insurrection in the new kingdom of Westphalia. Under such circumstances began the war of 1809, which may be called the First German War of Liberation, under the leadership of Austria. It was pro voked rather by Napoleon, who wanted new victories to retrieve his position, than by Austria, whose interest lay in gaining time, since time was likely to increase the ferment in Germany and weaken the alliance of Napoleon Cind Russia. Napoleon s superiority, though on the wane, was still enormous. Through the Confederation of the Rhine he had now a great German army at his disposal, which he placed under French generals. His frontier was most formidably advanced through the possession of Tyrol and Venetia. Russia was on his side, and, though she did not actively help him in the field, was of great use in holding down Prussia ; England was against, him, but could do little for an inland state such as Austria now was. In these circumstances the attitude of Austria had something heroic about it, like that of Spain, and the war throughout is like a somewhat pale copy of the Spanish insurrection. But Austria has what Spain had not, the advantage of organization and intelligence. Since Pressburg she had passed through a period of reform and shown some signs of moral regeneration, Stadion and tho archduke Charles doing for her, though not so effectively, what Stein and Scharnhorst did for Prussia. Few wars have begun with less ostensible ground, or more evidently from an intolerable position. Napoleon accused Austria of arming, of wanting war ; Austria expostulated, but in vain ; and war began. It began early in April, and the proclamation of the archduke Charles was addressed to the whole German nation. The watchword of Austria against France was now liberty and nationality. A good general conception of the war may be obtained by comparing it with that of 1805, which it resembles in certain large features. Again there is a short but decisive passage of arms in Bavaria ; in a five days struggle, cele brated for Napoleon s masterly manoeuvres, the Austrians are driven out of Ratisbon, and the way to Vienna is laid open. Again Napoleon enters Vienna (May 13th). But the war in Italy this time begins farther east, on the Piave. Eugene Beauharnais, after an unfortunate commencement, when he was defeated at Sacile by the archduke John, makes a successful advance, and being joined by Marmont, who makes his way to him from Dalmatia by way of Fiume, drives the Austrian army into Hungary, defeats them at Raab, and effects a junction with Napoleon at Bruck. Then, as before, the war is transferred from Vienna to the other side of the Danube. But the Austrian resist ance is now far more obstinate than in 1805. From the island of Lobau Napoleon throws his troops across the river in the face of the archduke. A battle takes place which occupies two successive days, and is sometimes called the battle of the Marchfeld, but is sometimes named from the villages of Gross- Aspern and Essling. Like that of Eylau in 1807 it is among the most terrible and bloody battles of the period. In all perhaps 50,000 men fell, among whom was Marshal Lannes, and the French were driven back into their island. Five weeks passed in inaction before Napoleon could retrieve this check, five weeks during which the condition of Europe was indeed singular, since its whole destiny depended upon a single man, who, besides the ordinary risks of a campaign, was threatened by an able adversary who had recently brought him to the verge of destruction, and by outraged populations which might rise in insurrection round him. This is the moment of the glory of Hofer, the hero of the peasant-war in Tyrol. Once more, however, Napoleon s skill and for tune prevailed. On the night of July 4th he succeeded, under cover of a false attack, in throwing six bridges from Lobau to the left bank of the Danube, over which more than 100,000 men passed before morning and were arrayed upon the Marchfeld. The obstinate battle of Battle of Wagram followed, in which, by a miscalculation which Wagram became the subject of much controversy, the archduke John came too late to his brother s help. The Austrians were worsted, but by no means decisively, and retired in good order. Austerlitz and Friedland had led at once to peace, because the principal belligerent, Russia, had little direct interest in the war ; Wagram ought to have had no similar effect. Austria was engaged in a war of liberation; Tyrol was emulating Spain; there should therefore have been no nego tiation with the invader. But Germany had as yet but half learnt the Spanish principle of war ; in particular the Austrian Government and the archduke Charles himself be longed to Old Austria rather than to New Germany. In the campaign the archduke had fallen much below his reputa tion, having allowed it plainly to appear that Napoleon frightened him, and now, instead of appealing again to German patriotism, he signed at Znaim (July llth) an armistice similar to that which Melas had so unaccount ably concluded after Marengo. But it was by no means certain that all was yet over. North Germany might riso as Spain had risen and as Tyrol had risen. The archduke Ferdinand had marched into Poland and threatened Thorn, with the intention of provoking such a movement in Prussia, and England was preparing a great armament which the patriots of North Germany, who now began to emulate the Spanish guerilla leaders, Schill,
