Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 19.djvu/385

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POR—POR

POLITICAL ECONOMY 369 institutions and works intended for public defence and the administration of justice, and those required for facilitating the commerce of the society, he considers those necessary for promoting the instruction of the people. He thinks the public at large may with propriety not only facilitate and encourage, but even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the acquisition in youth of the most essential elements of education. He suggests as the mode of enforcing this obligation the requirement of submission to a test examination " before any one could obtain the freedom in any corporation, or be allowed to set up a trade in any village or town corpor ate." Similarly, he is of opinion that some probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, might be enforced as a condition of exercising any liberal profession, or becoming a candidate for any honourable office. The expense of the institutions for religious instruction as well as for general education, he holds, may without injustice be defrayed out of the funds of the whole society, though he would apparently prefer that it should be met by the voluntary contributions of those who think they have occasion for such education or instruction. There is much that is sound, as well as interesting and suggestive, in this lifth book, in which he shows a political instinct and a breadth of view by which he is favourably contrasted with 1he Manchester school. But, if we may say so without disrespect to so great a man, there are traces in it of what is now called Philistinism a low view of the ends of art and poetry which arose perhaps in part from personal defect, though it was common enough in even the higher minds in his century. There are also indications of a certain deadness to the lofty aims and perennial im portance of religion, which was no doubt chiefly due to the influences of an age when the critical spirit was doing an indispensable work, in the performance of which the transitory was apt to be confounded with the permanent. For the sake of considering as a whole Smith s view of the functions of government, we have postponed noticing his treatment of the physiocratic system, which occupies a part of his fourth book. He had formed the acquaintance of Quesnay, Turgot, and other members of their group during his sojourn in France in 1765, and would, as he told Dugald Stewart, had the patriarch of the school lived long enough, have dedicated to him the Wealth of Nations. He declares that, with all its imperfections, the system of Quesnay is "perhaps the nearest approximation to the truth that had yet appeared on the subject of political economy." Yet he seems riot to be adequately conscious of the degree of coincidence between his own doctrines and those of the physiocrats. Dupont de Nemours complained that he did not do Quesnay the justice of recognizing him as his spiritual father. It is, however, alleged, on the other side, that already in 1753 Smith had been teaching as professor a body of economic doctrine the same in its broad features with that contained in his great work. This is indeed said by Stewart ; and, though he gives no evidence of it, it is possibly quite true ; if so, Smith s doc trinal descent must be traced rather from Hume than from the French school. The principal error of this school, that, namely, of representing agricultural labour as alone produc tive, he refutes in the fourth book, though in a manner which has not always been considered effective. Traces of the influence of their mistaken view appear to remain in his own work, as, for example, his assertion that in agriculture nature labours along with man, whilst in manufactures nature does nothing, man does all ; and his distinction between productive and unproductive labour, which was doubtless suggested by their use of those epithets, and which seems to be inconsistent with his recognition of what is now called "personal capital." To the same source M Culloch and others refer the origin of Smith s view, which they represent as an obvious error, that " individual advantage is not always a true test of the public advantageousness of different employments." But that view is really quite correct, as Prof. Nicholson has recently made plain. That the form taken by the use of capital, profits being given, is not indifferent to the working class as a whole even Ricardo admitted; and Cairnes, as we shall see, built on this consideration some of the most far-reaching conclusions in his Leading Prin ciples. On Smith s theory of taxation in his fifth book it is not necessary for us to dwell (see TAXATION). The well-known canons which he lays down as prescribing the essentials of a good system have been generally accepted. They have lately been severely criticized by Prof. Walker of whose objec tions, however, there is only one which appears to be well- founded. Smith seems to favour the view that the con tribution of the individual to public expenses may be regarded as payment for the services rendered to him by the state, and ought to be proportional to the extent of those services. If he held this opinion, which some of his expressions imply, he was certainly so far wrong in principle. We shall not be held to anticipate unduly if we remark here on the way in which opinion, revolted by the aberra tions of some of Smith s successors, has tended to turn from the disciples to the master. A strong sense of his comparative freedom from the vicious tendencies of Ricardo and his followers has recently prompted the suggestion that we ought now to recur to (Smith, and take up once more from him the line of the economical succession. But notwithstanding his indisputable superiority, and whilst fully recognizing the great services rendered by his immortal work, we must not forget that, as has been already said, that work was, on the whole, a product, though an exceptionally eminent one, of the negative philosophy of the last century, resting largely in its ulti mate foundation on metaphysical bases. The mind of Smith was mainly occupied with the work of criticism so urgent in his time his principal task was to discredit and overthrow the economic system then prevalent, and to demonstrate the radical unfitness of the existing European Governments to direct the industrial movement. This office of his fell in with, and formed a part of, the general work of demolition carried on by the thinkers who gave to the 18th century its characteristic tone. It is to his honour that, besides this destructive operation, he contri buted valuable elements to the preparation of an organic system of thought and of life. In his special domain he has not merely extinguished many errors and prejudices, and cleared the ground for truth, but has left us a per manent possession in the judicious analyses of economic facts and ideas, the wise practical suggestions, and the luminous indications of all kinds, with which his work abounds. Belonging to the best philosophical school of his period, that with which the names of Hume and Diderot are associated, he tended strongly towards the positive point of view. But it was not possible for him to attain it ; and the final and fully normal treatment of the economic life of societies must be constituted on other and more lasting foundations than those which underlie his imposing construction. It has been well said that of philosophic doctrines the saying " by their fruit ye shall know them " is eminently true. And it cannot be doubted that the germs of the vicious methods and false or exaggerated theories of Smith s successors are to be found in his own work, though his good sense and practical bent prevented his following out his principles to their extreme consequences. The

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