704 p R E P R E was dismissed in favour of the more elaborate form, and in November 1855 the first two volumes of his uncom pleted History of Philip II. were issued from the press, their sale eclipsing that of any of his earlier books. This was his last great undertaking ; but as Robertson s Charles V., in the light of new sources of information, was inade quate to take its place as a link in the series, he repub- lished it in an improved and extended form in December 1856. A slight attack of apoplexy on the 4th of February 1858 foretold the end, though he persevered with the preparation of the third volume of Philip II. for the press, and with the emendation and annotation of his Conquest of Mexico. On the morning of the 27th of January 1859 a second attack occurred, and he died in the afternoon of the same day in his sixty-third year. In personal character Prescott possessed many admirable and amiable qualities, his courageous bearing and persistent labour being by no means without their heroic element, though the greater portion of his life was passed with his friends and his books. A certain habit of striving to be habitual is curiously prominent from his boyhood till his death, the desire for an objective stimulus finding expression in numberless formal resolutions and in frequent wagers with his secretaries or friends. Necessarily a valetudinarian, the smallest details of life had to be considered by him, even to the adjustment of the weight of his dress to the state of the weather and the thermometer. Yet the formalism, whether voluntary or enforced, was never obtrusive, and the final impression made upon his contemporaries was that of a frank, spontaneous, and thoroughly manly life. As an historian he stands in the direct line of literary descent from Robertson, whose influence is clearly discernible both in his method and style. But, while Robertson was in some measure the initiator of a movement, Prescott came to his task when the range of information was incomparably wider and when progress in sociologic theory had thrown innumerable convergent lights upon the progress of events. He worked, therefore, upon more assured ground ; his sifting of authorities was more thorough and his method less restricted both in the selection of details and in their graphic presentation. At the same time he cannot be classed as in the highest sense a philosophic historian. His power lies chiefly in the clear grasp of fact, in selection and synthesis, in the vivid narration of incident. For extended analysis he had small liking and faculty ; his critical insight is limited in range, and he confines himself almost wholly to the concrete elements of history. When he does venture upon more abstract criticism his standards are often commonplace and superficial, and the world-scheme to which he relates events is less profound than the thought of his time altogether warranted. If these things, however, indicate failure from the point of view of ideal history, they at least make for popularity. Few historians have had in a higher degree that artistic feeling in the broad arrangement of materials which en sures interest. The course of his narrative is unperplexed by doubtful or insoluble problems ; no pretence at profundity or subtlety saps the vitality of his characters or interrupts the flow of incident with dissertation and digression. The painting is filled in with primary colours and with a free hand ; and any sense of -crudity which may be awakened by close inspection is compensated by the vigour and massive effectiveness of the whole. Though he did not bring to his work the highest scientific grasp, he brought to it scientific conscientiousness and thoroughness within his limitations, while his dominant pictorial faculty gave to his treatment a super- scientific brilliancy. The romance of history has seldom had an abler exponent, and the large number of editions and translations of his works attests their undiminished fascination at certain stages of popular culture. (R. M. W. ) PRESCRIPTION in the broadest sense of the word denotes the acquisition or extinction of rights by lapse of time. The term is derived from the prxscriptio of Roman law, originally a matter of procedure, a clause inserted before the formula on behalf of either the plaintiff or, in early times, the defendant, limiting the question at issue. (See PLEADING.) It was so called from its preceding the formula. 1 One of the defendant s pnxscriptiones was lonyi temporis or longse, possessionis prxscriptio (afterwards super seded by the exceptio), limiting the question to the fact of possession without interruption by the defendant for a certain time (see POSSESSION). It seems to have been introduced by the praetor to meet cases affecting aliens or " Prsescriptiones autem appellatas esse ab eo quod ante formulas prcescribuntur " (Gaius, iv. 132). lands out of Italy where the usucapio of the civil law (the original means of curing a defect of title by lapse of time) could not apply. The time of acquisition by usucapio was fixed by the Twelve Tables at one year for movables and two years for immovables. Prxscriptio thus constituted a kind of praetorian usucapio. In the time of Justinian usucapio B.ndprescriptio(cB,led also longi temporis possessio), as far as they affected the acquisition of ownership, differed only in name, usucapio being looked at from the point of view of property, prxscriptio from the point of view of pleading. By the legislation of Justinian movables were acquired by three years possession, immovables by ten years possession where the parties had their domicile in the same province (inter prxsentes), twenty years possession where they were domiciled in different provinces (inter (ibsentes). Servitudes could not be acquired by usucapio proper, but were said to be acquired by quasi usutapio, probably in the same time as sufficed to give a title to immovables. There was also a longissimi temporis possessio of thirty years, applicable to both movables and immov ables, and requiring nothing but bona fides on the part of the possessor. Where the right sought to be established was claimed against the church, a still longer period of forty years (at one time a hundred) was necessary. Im memorial prescription was required in a few cases of a public character, as roads. 2 Prxscriptio was also the term applied to lapse of time as barring actions upon contracts or torts under various provisions corresponding to the Eng lish Statutes of Limitation. The prescription of Roman law (and of modern systems based upon it) is thus both acquisitive and extinctive. It looks either to the length of time during which the defendant has been in possession, or to the length of time during which the plaintiff has been out of possession. In English law the latter kind of prescription is called LIMITATION (q.v.). The tendency of law is to substitute a definite for an indefinite period of prescription. In English law prescription is used in a comparatively narrow sense. It is acquisitive only, and is very limited in its application. A title by prescription can be made only to incorporeal hereditaments that is, in legal language, hereditaments that are or have been appendant or appurte nant to corporeal hereditaments and to certain exemp tions and privileges. 3 The rights claimable by prescription for the most part consist of rights in alieno solo. The most important are advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, watercourses, lights, offices, dignities, franchises, pensions, annuities, and rents. Land or movables cannot be claimed by prescription. The foundation of prescription is the pre sumption of law that a person found in undisturbed enjoy ment of a right did not come into possession by an unlawful act (see Williams, Rif/hts of Common, 3). In the English courts this presumption was, perhaps it may be said still is, based upon the fiction of a lost grant, viz., that at some time in the past there had been a grant of the heredita ment by a person capable of granting it to a person capable of taking it, and that the grant had been lost. The jury were instructed to find the loss of a once existing grant in whose existence no one really believed. The enjoyment of the right must have been from a time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. The period of legal memory was after a time necessarily fixed for purposes of convenience at a certain date. The date adopted varied at first with the time during which the demandant in a writ of right must have proved seisin in himself or his "Vise vicinales, quarum memoria non extut " (I>!f/., xliii. 7, 3). 3 Prescription seems at one time to have borne a wider meaning. A claim by prescription to land is mentioned in 32 Hen. VIII. c. 2. And it seems that tenants in common may still make title to land by
prescription (Littleton s Tenures, 310).