P S Y P S Y 37 Nevertheless, the continuous struggle between the " black " and " white " people (the patricians and the plebeians) offered many opportunities to Moscow for interference in the internal affairs of 1'skofF, especially with regard to the election of the princes, which was often the occasion of severe conflicts. In 1399 the prince of Moscow arrogated the privilege of confirming the elected prince of Pskoff in his rights ; and though, fifty years later, Pskoff and Nov- gorod concluded several defensive treaties against Moscow the fall of both republics was inevitable, the poorer classes continuing to seek at Moscow a protection against the oppression of the richer citizens. After the fall of Novgorod (1475) Pskoff could no longer maintain its independence, and in 1510 it was taken by Vasilii Joannovitch. The vyetche was abolished and its bell taken away, and a waywode was nominated by Moscow to govern the city. Moscow merchants were settled at Pskoff, and put in possession of the fortunes of the former citizens. The conquered territory still maintained to some extent its self-government, especially with re- gard to trade, but the struggle between rich and poor was aggravated by the intervention of foreigners. The " lutschiye ludi " (wealthier merchants) prohibited the " malomotchnyie " (poorer merchants) from entering into direct trade relations with foreigners, and com- pelled them to sell their wares to themselves or to become their agents. These disputes furnished Moscow at the end of the 17th century with a pretext for abolishing the last vestiges of self-govern- ment at Pskoff, and for placing all affairs of local administration in the hands of the Moscow waywodes. Thenceforward Pskoff fell into rapid decay. It became a stronghold of Russia against Poland and was besieged for seven months by Stephan Bathory during the Livonian War, and later on by Gustavus Adolphus. Under Pete? I. it became a fortified camp, and its walls were protected by earth- works. But it never recovered its former importance, and is now one of the poorer cities of the empire. (P. A. K. ) PSYCHE. See CUPID. PSYCHOLOGY The Standpoint of Psychology. IN the several natural sciences the scope and subject- matter of each are so evident that little preliminary discussion on this score is called for. It is easy to dis- tinguish the facts dealt with in a treatise on light from those that belong to one on sound ; and even when the need arises to compare the results of two such sciences as in the case, say, of light and electricity there is still no difficulty, apart, of course, from any which the im- perfect state of the sciences themselves may occasion. Theoretically, a standpoint is attainable from which this comparison can be made, in so far, say, as the facts of both sciences can be expressed in terms of matter and motion. But with psychology, however much it is freed from metaphysics, all this is different. It is indeed ordi- narily assumed that its subject-matter can be at once denned: "It is what you can perceive by consciousness or reflexion or the internal sense," says one, "just as the subject-matter of optics is what you can perceive by sight." Or, "psychology is the science of the phenomena of mind," we are told again, "and is thus marked off from the physical sciences, which treat only of the phenomena of matter." But, whereas nothing is simpler than to dis- tinguish between seeing and hearing, or between the phenomena of heat and the phenomena of gravitation, a very little reflexion may convince us that we cannot in the same fashion distinguish internal from external sense, or make clear to ourselves what we mean by phenomena of mind as distinct from phenomena of matter, .ternal Let us begin with the supposed differentia of internal and ex- id ex- ternal ; and first of all what are we to understand by an inner rnal. sense ? To every sense there corresponds a sense-organ ; the several senses are distinct and independent, so that no one sense can add to or alter the materials of another ; and each is sui generis as regards quality, the possession of five senses, e.g., furnishing no data as to the character of a possible sixth. Moreover, sense-im- pressions are passively received and occur in the first instance with- out regard to the feeling or volition of the recipient and without any manner of relation to the ' ' contents of consciousness " at the moment. Now such a description will apply but very partially to the so-called "internal sense." We can imagine consciousness without self-consciousness, still more without introspection, much as we can imagine sight without taste or smell. But this does not entitle us to speak of self-consciousness as a sense. For we do not by means of it passively receive impressions differing from all previous presentations, as the sensations of colour for one couched differ from all he has experienced before : the new facts consist rather in the recognition of certain relations among pre-existing presentations, i.e., are due to our mental activity and not to a special mode of what has been called our sensitivity. For when we taste we cannot hear that we taste, when we see we cannot smell that we see ; but when we taste we may be conscious that we taste, when we hear we may be conscious that we hear. In this way all the objects of the external senses are recognized as having new relations by the miscalled "internal sense." Moreover, the facts so ascertained are never independent of feeling and volition and of the contents of consciousness at the time, as true sensations are. Also if we consult the physiologist we learn that there is no evidence of any organ or " centre " that could be regarded as the " physical basis " of this inner sense ; and, if self-consciousness alone is tempo- rarily in abeyance and a man merely " beside himself, " such state of delirium has little analogy to the functional blindness or deafness that constitutes the temporary suspension of sight or hearing. To the conception of an internal perception or observation the preceding objections do not necessarily apply, that is to say, this conception may be so defined that they need not. But then in proportion as we escape the charge of assuming a special sense which furnishes the material for such perception or observation, in that same proportion are we compelled to seek for some other mode of distinguishing its subject-matter. For, so far as the mere mental activity of perceiving or observing is concerned, it is not easy to see any essential difference in the process whether what is observed be psychical or physical. It is quite true that the so-called psychological observation is more difficult, because the facts observed are often less definite and less persistent, and admit less of actual isolation than physical facts do ; but the process of recognizing similarities or differences, the dangers of mal-observa- tion or non-observation, are not materially altered on that account. It may be further allowed that there is one difficulty peculiarly felt in psychological observation, the one most inaccurately ex- pressed by saying that here the observer and the observed are one. But this difficulty is surely in the first instance due to the very obvious fact that our powers of attention are limited, so that we cannot alter the distribution of attention at any moment without altering the contents of consciousness at that moment. Accord- ingly, where there are no other ways of surmounting this difficulty, the psychological observer must either trust to representations at a later time, or he must acquire the power of taking momentary glances at the psychological aspects of the phase of consciousness in question. And this one with any aptitude for such studies can do with so slight a diversion of attention as not to disturb very seriously either the given state or that which immediately succeeds it. But very similar difficulties have to be similarly met by physical observers in certain special cases, as, e.g., in observing and registering the phenomena of solar eclipse j and similar apti- tudes in the distribution of attention have to be acquired, say, by extempore orators or skilful surgeons. Just as little, then, as there is anything that we can with propriety call an inner sense, just so little can we find in the process of inner perception any satis- factory characteristic of the subject-matter of psychology. The question still is : What is it that is perceived or observed ? and the readiest answer of course is : Internal experience as distinguished from external, what takes place in the mind as distinct from Avhat takes place without. This answer, it must be at once allowed, is adequate for most purposes, and a great deal of excellent psychological work has been done without ever calling it in question. But the distinction be- tween internal and external experience is not one that can be drawn from the standpoint of psychology, at least not at the outset. From this standpoint it appears to be either (1) inaccurate or (2) not extra - psychological. As to (1), the boundary between the internal and the external was, no doubt, originally the surface of the body, with which the subject or self was identified ; and in this sense the terms are of course correctly used. For a thing may, in the same sense of the word, be in one space and therefore not in i.e., out of another ; but we express no intelligible relation if we speak of two things as being one in a given room and the other in last week. Any one is at liberty to say if he choose that a certain thing is "in his mind"; but if in this way he distinguishes it from something else not in his mind, then to be intelligible this must imply one of two statements, either that the something else is actually or possibly in some other mind, or, his own mind being alone considered, that at the time the something else does not exist at all. Yet, evident as it seems that the correlatives in and not-in must both apply to the same category, whether space,
