512 KHETORIC bpurl). The distinction between justice and equity (r& OIKO.IOV and rb tirteiicts) is noticed. Equity is "a kind of justice, but goes beyond the written law," as in the Ethics (v. 10) equity is said to be a corrective of the law, where the latter fails through generality, i.e., through the lawmaker's inability to frame a general rule which should precisely fit the circumstances of every particular case. True to his conception of a method, Aristotle next applies "the topic of degree" to injustice, as, in an earlier chapter (Rhet., i. 7) he had applied it to the idea of "good." The analysis of the three branches of rhetoric deliberative, epideictic, forensic is now finished. In the closing chapter of his first book, Aristotle briefly considers and dismisses the " inarti- ficial proofs," the means of persuasion, that is, which arise from matters external to the art itself, though the art uses them. These, having regard to the actual circumstances of his time and country, he declares to be five : (1) laws ; (2) witnesses ; (3) evidence given under torture fidcravos ; (4) documents ; (5) oaths, meaning chiefly treaties between states. With regard to (3) it may be re- marked that the rhetorical theory of torture in the ancient world was, that a person under torture will tell the truth because it is his interest to do so. This is stated, e.g., in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, xv. 1. Among the Attic orators, Isseus gives his emphatic adhesion to this view (Or., viii. 12). On the other hand, the common-sense view of the matter is very well put by another Attic orator, Antiphon, in his speech De Csedc Hcrodis (31-33), when he remarks that "in the torturers is the hope of the tortured." "So long, then," Antiphon proceeds, "as the slave felt that his prospects in slandering were hopeful, he was obstinate in the calumny ; but, when he saw that he was to die, then at last he told the truth, and said that he had been per- suaded by the persecutors to slander me." It would have been interesting if Aristotle had given some indication of his view on this, his third, &rtx v s irtffrts ; but he simply accepts it as a fact of his day, and, taking it along with the rest, gives a number of general arguments which may be used on either side, according as the particular Hrex* * irlaris is for us or against us. Here the first book ends. At the beginning of the second book, Aristotle returns to the "artificial proofs" (eWex" iri<rreis) those which rhetoric itself provides. Of these, the logical proof has already been in part discussed (i. 2). He therefore turns to the " ethical " proof. The speaker's character may be so indicated by his speech as to pre- possess the hearers ; and this result depends chiefly on three things. He should make them feel that he possesses (1) Qpitvriais intelligence ; (2) Aper-ft virtue ; and (3) fdi/ota good-will to them. Aristotle then proceeds to furnish the speaker with the materials for seeming intelligent and good, referring for these to his previous analysis of the virtues (i. 9). As to the means of seeming friendl}', these will be furnished by an analysis of the affections (irddi)). Here we are already on the boundary line between the "ethical proof" and the third of the (vrtx v l ttiffreis, the "emotional proof." In regard to each affection (vddos), we have to see (1) what it is ; (2) what things predispose men to it ; (3) the objects and conditions of its manifestation. The next ten chanters of the second book (2-11) are accordingly devoted to an analysis of those emotions which it is most important for the rhetorician to understand : viz. (1) anger, and its opposite, mild- ness ; (2) love and hatred ; (3) fear and boldness ; (4) compassion, envy, emulation ; (5) shame and shamelessness ; (6) gratitude (x<fy>s) ; (7) righteous indignation (vepeais). But, in appealing to these various emotions, the speaker must have regard to the general character of his audience, according, e.g., as they are young or old, rich or poor, &c. Hence it is necessary to know the character- istics of the various periods and conditions of life. Aristotle therefore delineates the chief traits of the young, of the old, and of men in their prime ; of the well-born, the rich, and the power- ful. With regard to the well-born, he makes a remark which seems equally true of the rich : " the possessor of good birth is the more ambitious ; for all men, when they have got anything, are wont to add to the heap" (ch. 12-17). The analysis of the "ethical" and the ' ' emotional " proof is now finished. After a concise retrospect, Aristotle passes to the treatment of a subject barely indicated in the first book (ch. 2). The KOIVO r6iroi, or "universal commonplaces," applicable to all materials, are' mainly four: (1) rd $uvar6i> and rb aSiivarov possibility and impossibility ; (2) rb yeyovSs and rb nfov past and future ; (3) rb aGftr ical fittovv (or futytOos and /j.iicpdrr)s) great and small ; (4) rb fiaoi> teal fyrrov greater and less. Aristotle means that all subjects whatsoever admit of arguments into which these ideas enter. The first comes into play when we argue, "since this is possible, that must be so also"; the second, when we say, "if this has been, that has been also," or "if this is to happen, that will happen also." For the third and fourth of the Kotvol r6irot, magnitude and degree, we are referred back to bk. i. ch. 7 and 8, where they have already been handled. The second book is com- pleted by a sort of appendix, intended to supplement the sketch of the "logical proof" given in bk. i. ch. 2. The "example," or "The rhetorical induction, had been rather cursorily treated there, and ample is now illustrated more fully (ii. 20). There are two kinds of'con- " example" the historical (rb irpdynara tyfiv) and the artificial tinued (rb avrbv iroielv). The artificial example, again, has two species (1) comparison, tfapa$oi], as when Socrates said that magis- trates ought not to be chosen by lot, for this is like choosing athletes by lot, rather than for athletic power ; (2) fiction, or fable in the special sense yot ; as when Stesichorus warned the people of Himera against establishing a despot by telling them the fable of the horse who asked the man to help him against a deer. If you have no arguments of a logical kind (enthymemes), says Aristotle, the " example " must do duty as proof ; if you have enthymemes, it can serve as illustration. The use of yvwpai, or general moral sentiments, next claims The us attention (ch. 21). These are of two classes those which arc self- ofyvui evident, and those which, not being so obviously true, require some confirmatory comment (tvioyos), as when Medea says that no sensible man should allow his children to be exquisitely educated, because it makes them fastidious and unpopular. Sucli maxims with an "epilogue" are, in fact, virtually enthymemes. Apropos of yvtoftat, Aristotle remarks that spurious generalization is particularly useful in the utterance of bitter complaint (e.g., " frailty, thy name is woman "). Then it is often effective to controvert received maxims, e.g. , "It is not well , to 'know oneself ; for if this man had known himself, he would never have become a general " (ch. 21). Some precepts on the enthymeme follow. The rhetorical reasoner On the must not have too many links in the chain of his argument ; and use of he must omit those propositions which his hearers can easily the ent supply. Also, it is highly important to know the special topics rneme. (e?5T/) from which enthymemes can be drawn in each subject. The enthymeme is either (1) SetxTiicSi', demonstrative, establishing a point, or (2) efyKriic6i>, refutative, destroying a position by a comparison of conflicting statements (rb ra avo^oXoyov^eva <rvvd- yeiv). Aristotle now gives (ii. 23) an enumeration of classes or heads of argument (fv6vfj.rinariKol r6iroi) from which enthymemes can be constructed. These apply nominally to all three branches of rhetoric, but in fact chiefly to the deliberative and the forensic. The demonstrative enthymeme is almost exclusively treated, since the refutative form can, of course, be inferred from the other. A chapter (24), answering to the treatise on fallacies in logic (irepl ffo<pi(rriKwv ftyx<av), is devoted to the fallacious (<j>aii>6/j.evov) enthymeme, of which ten "topics" are explained and illustrated. Another chapter is given to the two general types of vvis, or refutation (ch. 25), viz., (1) direct counter-argument (rb O.VTKTV- oyt(effOai), opposing one enthymeme to another ; (2) objection to a particular point in the adversary's case (rb IviarraffQai). The second book then concludes with some supplementary remarks, meant, seemingly, to correct errors made by previous writers on rhetoric (ch. 26). In his first two books Aristotle has thus dealt with invention Book I (evpea-ts) the discovery of means of persuasion. In the third book he deals with expression and arrangement (Ae'fis and rafts). The subject is prepared by some remarks on the art of delivery ( inroKpta-is), Delivei which Aristotle defines as the management of the voice. It is the art of knowing how to use the voice for the expression of each feeling, of knowing when it should be loud, low, or moderate, of managing its pitch shrill, deep, or middle and of adapting the cadences to the theme." Aristotle says nothing on gesture or play of feature, which Cicero and Quintilian recognize as important. He includes them by implication, however, in saying that the art of delivery, whenever it is reduced to method, " will perform the function of the actor's art," adding that "the dramatic faculty is less a matter of art than of nature.' But verbal expression, at least, is clearly in the province of art, and to that he now turns. He deals first with diction (As is) in Dictio the proper sense, as concerned with the choice of words and phrases. The first excellence of diction is clearness (ffa^vtia), which is attained by using words in their proper sense (Kvpia). Next, the diction must be "neither too low nor too grand, but suitable to the subject." In prose (Iv rols fyio?s yois) there is less scope for ornament than in poetry, though in the latter, too, much depends on the speaker or the theme. And here Aristotle remarks that Euripides was the first poet who produced a happy illusion by taking his words from the language of daily life (tic rys diaOvias SiaAe/crou). With a view to adorning prose, and giving it "distinction" (the term which best represents Aristotle's phrase tvov or fviK>v iroitiv), nothing is more important than the judicious use of metaphor. Aristotle admits that "the art of metaphor cannot be taught"; but he gives some sensible hints on the subject, and on the use of epithets. The poet Simonides, he tells us, when the winner of a mule race offered him a small fee, declined to write an ode on "half- asses, "but, when the price was raised, sang "Hail, daughters of windswift steeds." The perceptions which made the best Greek prose so good are illustrated by Aristotle's next chapter (iii. 3) on l>vxpd, "frigidities," " faults of style. " He traces these to four
