Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 20.djvu/779

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CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES.] ROME 755 0)3, -6 u>8

the future the interest of Roman history centres in her attempts to perform the two Herculean tasks which this unique position laid upon her, the efficient government of the subject peoples, and their defence against the bar- barian races which swarmed around them on all sides. They were tasks under which the old republican constitu- tion broke down, and which finally overtaxed the strength even of the marvellous organization framed and elaborated by Augustus and his successors. At the outset the difficulties of Rome were increased by the rapidity with which her new duties came upon her. From a century, first of deadly struggle, and then of dazzlingly easy success, she emerged to find herself called upon to govern a world with the primitive machinery of a small city state, and to deal with new and complicated ad- ministrative problems which she had as yet had no leisure to study. Nor was it until her own political system had been remodelled that she was able to deal effectively with the government of the empire at large. During the period which has now to be considered, the period of the so-called Revolution, but little advance was made towards a better imperial organization, and that little was made by men who, like Caesar and Pompey, belonged, both in the methods and aims of their policy and in the position they held, to the empire rather than to the republic. Although in its outward form the old constitution had undergone little change during the age of war and con- _ quest from 265 to 146, l the causes, both internal and

  • external," which brought about its fall had been silently

at work throughout. Its form was in strictness that of a moderate democracy. The patriciate had ceased to exist as a privileged caste, 2 and there was no longer any order of nobility recognized by the constitution. The senate and the offices of state were in law open to all, 3 and the will of the people in their comitia had been in the most explicit and unqualified manner declared to be supreme alike in the election of magistrates, in the passing of laws, and in all matters touching the " caput " of a Roman citizen. But in practice the constitution had become an oligarchy. The senate, not the assembly, ruled Rome, and both the senate and the magistracies were in the hands of a class which, in defiance of the law, arrogated to itself the title and the privileges of a nobility. 4 The ascendency of the senate is too obvious and familiar a fact to need much illustration here. It is but rarely that the assembly was called upon to decide questions of policy, and then the proposal was usually made by the magistrate in obedience to the express directions of the senate. 5 In the enormous majority of cases the matter was settled by a senatus consultum, without any reference to the people at all. The assembly decides for war or peace 6 , but the conduct of the war and the conditions of peace are matters left to the senate. Now and then the assembly confers a 1 The most important change was the assimilation of the division by classes and centuries with that by tribes, a change effected appa- rently by the censors in their revision of the register, and probably effeeteti gradually. For a full discussion of the point, see Mommsen, R. G., i. 818 ; Lange, Rom. Alterth., ii. 463 (where the literature is given) ; Madvig, Verf. d. Rom. ReicJis, i. 117. A second constitu- tional question was the franchise of the freedmeh ; see Nitzsci, Die Gracchen, 132 (Berlin, 1847) 2 A few offices of a more or less priestly character were still filled only by patricians, e.g. , rex sacrorum, flamen Dialis. A plebeian first became "curio maximus" in 209 (545 A.U.C.); Livy, xxvii. 8; see Mommsen, Rom. borsch., i. 77-127. 3 The " lectio senatus " was in the hands of the censors, but whether before Sulla's time their choice was subject to legal restric- tfons is doubtful. Cf. Cicero Pro Sestio, 65, " Deligerentur in id consilium ab universo populo." 4 Mommsen, R. G., i. 781 sq. ; J^ange, Rom. Alterth., ii. " Ex auctoritate senatus. " The lex Flamiuia agraria of 232 was an exception, Cic. De-Senect., 4 ; Polyb., ii. 21. 6 Livy, xxxi. 5, xxxiii. 25, xxxvii. 55. command upon the man of its choice, or prolongs the imperium of a magistrate, 7 but, as a rule, these and all questions connected with foreign affairs are settled within the walls of the senate house. It is the senate which year after year assigns the commands and fixes the number and disposition of the military forces, 8 directs the organ- ization of a new province, 9 conducts negotiations, and forms alliances. Within Italy, though its control of affairs was less exclusive, we find that, besides supervis- ing the ordinary current business of administration, the senate decides questions connected with the Italian allies, sends out colonies, allots lands, and directs the suppres- sion of disorders. Lastly, both in Italy and abroad it managed the finances. 10 Inseparably connected with this monopoly of affairs to the exclusion of the assembly was the control which in practice, if not in theory, the senate exercised over the magistrates. The latter had become what Cicero wrongly declares they were always meant to be, merely the subordinate ministers of the supreme council, 11 which assigned them their departments, provided them with the necessary equipment, claimed to direct their conduct, prolonged their commands, and rewarded them with triumphs. It was now at once the duty and the interest of a magistrate to be " in auctoritate senatus," " subject to the authority of the senate," and even the once formidable "tribuni plebis" are found during this period actively and loyally supporting the senate, and acting as its spokesmen in the assembly. 12 The causes of this ascendency of the senate are not to Its causes be found in any additions made by law to its constitu- tional prerogatives, but first of all in the fact that the senate was the only body capable of conducting affairs in an age of incessant war. The voters in the assembly, a numerous, widely scattered body, many of whom were always away with the legions abroad, could not readily be called together, and when assembled were very imper- fectly qualified to decide momentous questions of military strategy and foreign policy. The senate, on the contrary, could be summoned in a moment, 13 and included in its ranks all the skilled statesmen and soldiers of the common- wealth, while its forms of procedure were at least better fitted than those of the comitia for securing the careful discussion and prompt decision of the question before it. The subordination of the magistrates was equally the result of circumstances, though it suited the senatorial advocates of a later day to represent it as an original prin- ciple of the constitution, and though it was encouraged and confirmed by the policy of the senate itself. 14 For, as the numbers of the magistrates, and also the area of govern- ment, increased, some central controlling power became absolutely necessary to prevent collisions between rival authorities, and to secure a proper division of labour, as well as to enforce the necessary concert and co-operation, 15 nor could such a power be found anywhere in the repub- lican system but in the senate, standing as it necessarily did in the closest relations with the magistrate, and com- posed as it was increasingly of men who were or had been in office. Once more, behind both senate and magistrates lay the The , . "nobiles. 7 Livy, xxix. 40, xxx. 27, 41, xxxi. 50. 8 Livy, xxvi. 1, " consules de republica, de administratione belli, ae provinciis exercitibusque patres consuluerunt." 9 Livy, xlv. 18. 10 Ihne, R. G., iv. 43 ; Polyb., vi. 13. 11 Pro Sestio, 65, "quasi ministros gravissimi consilii." 12 Livy, xxvii. 5, xxviii. 45. 13 Livy, xxii. 7; in 191 the senators were forbidden to leave Rome for more than a day. Nor were more than five to be absent at once j Livy, xxxvi. 3. 14 E.g., the abandonment of the dictatorship and the growing infre- quency of re-electioa after the Second Punic War. 15 Livy, xxvii. 35 ; xxxv. 42, 48.