PSYCHOLOGY 71 um- We are now at the end of our survey of certain typical mryand pleasurable and painful states. The answer to our in- 3sult- quiry which it seems to suggest is that there is pleasure in proportion as a maximum of attention is effectively exercised, and pain in proportion as such effective atten- tion is frustrated by distractions, shocks, or incomplete and faulty adaptations, or fails of exercise, owing to the narrowness of the field of consciousness and the slowness and smallness of its changes. Something must be said in explication of this formula, and certain objections that might be made to it must be considered. First of all, it implies that feeling is determined partly by quantitative, or, as we might say r material, conditions, and partly by conditions that are formal or qualitative. As regards the former, both the intensity or concentration of attention and its diffusion or the extent of the field of consciousness have to be taken into account. Attention, whatever else it is, is a limited quantity Pluribus inteutus minor est ad singula sensus to quote Hamilton's pet adage. Moreover, as we have seen, attention requires time. If, then, attention be dis- tributed over too wide a field, there is a corresponding loss of intensity, and so of distinctness : we tend towards a succession of indistinguishables indistinguishable, there- fore, from no succession. We must not have more pre- sentations in the field of consciousness than will alloAv of some concentration of attention : a maximum diffusion will not do. A maximum concentration, in like manner even if there were no other objection to it would seem to conflict with the general conditions of consciousness, inasmuch as a single simple presentation, however intense, would admit of no differentiation, and any complex pre- sentation is in some sort a plurality. The most effective attention, then, as regards its quantitative conditions, must lie somewhere between the two zeros of complete indifference and complete absorption. If there be an excess of diffusion, effective attention will increase up to a certain point as concentration increases, but beyond that point will decrease if this intensification continues to in- crease ; and vice versa, if there be an excess of concentra- tion. But, inasmuch as these quantitative conditions involve a plurality of distinguishable presentations or changes in consciousness, the way is open for formal con- ditions as well. Since different presentations consort differently when above the threshold of consciousness together, one field may be wider and yet as intense as another, or intenser and yet as wide, owing to a more advantageous arrangement of its constituents. 1 Dative The doctrine here developed, viz., that feeling depends on efficiency, is in the main as old as Aristotle ; all that has been done is to give it a more accurately psychological expression, and to free it from the implications of the faculty theory,-in which form it was expounded by Hamil- ton. Of possible objections there are at least two that we must anticipate, and the consideration of which will 1 As it is impossible to say that any distinguishable presentation is absolutely simple, the hypothesis of subconsciousness would leave us free to assume that any pleasantness or unpleasantness that cannot be explained on the score of intensity is due to some obscure harmony or discord, compatibility or incompatibility, of elements not separately discernible. But this, though tempting, is not really a very scientific procedure. If a particular presentation is pleasurable or painful in such wise as to lead to a redistribution of attention, it is reasonable to look for an explanation primarily in its connexion with the rest of the field of consciousness. Moreover, it is obvious since what takes place in subconsciousness can only be explained in analogy with what takes place in consciousness that, if we have an inexplicable in the one, we must have a corresponding inexplicable in the other. If the feeling produced by what comports itself as a simple presentation cannot be explained by what is in consciousness, we should be forced to admit that some presentations are unpleasant simply because they are un- pleasant an inexplicability which the hypothesis of subconsciousness might push farther back but would not remove. help to make the general view clearer. First, it may be urged that, according to this view, it ought to be one con- tinuous pain to fall asleep, since in this state consciousness is rapidly restricted both as to intensity and range. This statement is entirely true as regards the intensity and substantially true as regards the range, at least of the higher consciousness : certain massive and agreeable organic sensations pertain to falling asleep, but the variety of presentations at all events grows less. But then the capacity to attend is also rapidly declining : even a slight intruding sensation entails an acute sense of strain in one sense, in place of the massive pleasure of repose throughout; and any voluntary concentration either in order to move or to think involves a like organic conflict, futile effort, and arrest of balmy ease. There is as regards the more definite constituents of the field of consciousness a close resemblance between natural sleepiness and the state of monotonous humdrum we call tedium or ennui ; and yet the very same excitement that would relieve the one by dissipating the weariness of inaction would disturb the other by renewing the weariness of action : the one is commensurate with the resources of the moment, the other is not. Thus the maximum of effective attention in question is, as Aristotle would say, a maximum " relative to us." It is possible, therefore, that a change from a wider to a narrower field of consciousness may be a pleasurable change, if attention is more effectively engaged. Strictly speaking, however, the so-called negative pleasures of rest do not consist in a mere narrowing of the field of conscious- ness so much as in a change in the amount of concentration. Massive organic sensations connected with restoration take the place of the comparatively acute sensations of jaded powers forced to work. We have, then, in all cases to bear in mind this subjective relativity of all pleasurable or painful states of consciousness. But there is still another and more serious difficulty to Do plea- face. It has long been a burning question with theoretical Sl } res moralists whether pleasures differ only quantitatively or v^ differ qualitatively as well, whether psychological analysis tively ? will justify the common distinction of higher and lower pleasures or force us to recognize nothing but differences of degree, of duration, and so forth, as expounded, e.g., by Bentham, whose cynical mot, " Pushpin is as good as poetry provided it be as pleasant," was long a stumbling- block in the way of utilitarianism. The entire issue here is confused by an ambiguity in terms that has been already noticed : pleasure and pleasures have not the same conno- tation. By a pleasure or pleasures we mean some assign- able presentation or presentations which are pleasant, i.e., afford pleasure ; by pleasure simply is meant this subject- ive state of feeling itself. The former, like other objects of knowledge, admit of classification and comparison : we may distinguish them as coarse or as noble, or, if we will, as cheap and wholesome. But, while the causes of feeling are manifold, the feeling itself is a subjective state, varying only in intensity and duration. The best evidence of this lies in the general character of the actions that ensue through feeling, the matter which has next to engage us. Whatever be the variety in the sources of pleasure, what- ever be the moral or conventional estimate of their worthi- ness, if a given state of consciousness is pleasant we seek to retain it, if painful to be rid of it : we prefer greater pleasure before less, less pain before greater. This is, in fact, the whole meaning of preference as a psychological term. Wisdom and folly prefer each the course which the other rejects. Both courses cannot, indeed, be objectively preferable ; that, however, is not a matter for psychology. But, as soon as reflexion begins, exceptions to this primary principle of action seem to arise continually, even though we regard the individual as a law to himself. Such excep-
