EPICURUS 475 other ways ; only let us have no myths of divine action. To assign only a single cause for these phenomena, when the facts familiar to us suggest several, is insane, and is just the absurd conduct to be expected from people who dabble in the vanities of astronomy We need not be too curious to inquire how these celestial phenomena actually do come about; we can learn how they might have been produced, and to go further is to trench on ground beyond the limits of human knowledge. Thus, if Epicurus objects to the doctrine of mythology, he objects no less to the doctrine of an inevitable fate, a necessary order of things unchangeable and supreme over the human will. " Better were it," he says, " to accept all the legends of the gods than to make ourselves slaves to the fate of the natural philosophers." Fatalism, which was the doctrine of the Stoics, seemed to Epicurus no less deadly a foe of man s true welfare than popular supersti tion. Even in the movement of the atoms he introduces a sudden change of direction, which is supposed to render their aggregation easier, and to break the even law of destiny. So, in the sphere of human action, Epicurus would allow of no absolutely controlling necessity. There is much in our circumstances that springs from mere chance, but it does not overmaster man. With a latent optimism, Epicurus asserts that, though there are evils in the world, still their domination is brief at the height, and there are many consoling circumstances ; while, on the other hand, it is easy to attain the maximum of pleasure. The sphere of man s action is marked by self determina tion , he need own no master. " Better," he says, " is the misfortune of the man who has planned his way wisely, than the prosperity of him who has devised foolishly." In fact, it is only when we assume for man this indepen dence of the gods and of fatality that the Epicurean theory of life becomes possible It assumes that man can, like the gods, withdraw himself out of reach of all external influences, and thus, as a sage, " live like a god among men, seeing that the man is in no wise like a mortal creature who lives in undying blessedness." And this pre sent life is the only one. With one consent Epicureanism preaches that the death of the body is the end of every thing for man, and hence the other world has lost all its terrors as well as all its hopes. The attitude of Epicurus in this whole matter is antago nistic to science. The idea of a systematic enchainment of phenomena, in which each is conditioned by every other, and none can be taken in isolation and explained apart from the rest, was foreign to his mind. When that idea is embraced, then obviously the whole group of phenomena must be taken into account in determining whether any hypothesis will serve to explain a detached section. But so little was the scientific conception of the solar system familiar to Epicurus that he could reproach the astronomers, because their account of an eclipse represented things other wise than as they appear to the senses, and could declare that the sun and stars were just as large as they seemed to us. The moral philosophy of Epicurus is the heir of the Cyrenaic doctrine that pleasure is the good thing in life. Neither sect, it may be added, advocated sensuality pure and unfeigned, the Epicurean least of all. By pleasure Epicurus meant both more and less than the Cyrenaics. To the Cyrenaics pleasure was of moments ; to Epicurus it extended as a habit of mind through life. To the Cyrenaics pleasure was something active and positive ; to Epicurus it was rather negative, tranquillity more than vigorous enjoyment. The test of true pleasure, according to Epicurus, is the removal and absorption of all that gives pain ; it implies freedom from pain of body and from trouble of mind. The happiness of the Epicurean was, it might almost seem, a grave and solemn pleasure a quiet unobtrusive ease of heart, but not exuberance and excitement. The Cyrenaic was a buoyant and self- reliant nature, who lived in the light of a grander day in Greece ; and he plucked pleasures carelessly and lightly from the trees in the garden of life as he passed through on his journey, without anxiety for the future, or regret for the past. The sage- of Epicureanism is a rational and reflective seeker for happiness, who balances the claims of each pleasure against the evils that may possibly ensue, and treads the path of enjoyment cautiously, as befits "a sober reason which inquires diligently into the grounds of acting or refraining from action, and which banishes those prejudices from which spring the chief perturbation of the soul. Prudential wisdom is therefore the only means by which a truly happy life may be attained ; it is thus the chief excellence, and the foundation of all the virtues. It is, in fact, says Epicurus, in language which contrasts strongly with that of Aristotle on the same topic " a more precious power than philosophy." Pleasure still remains the end; but the natural instinct which prompts to take any opportunity of enjoyment is held in check by the reflection on consequences. The reason or intellect is introduced to measure pleasures to balance possible pleasures and pains to construct a scheme in which pleasures are the materials of a happy life. Feeling, which Epicurus declared to be the means of determining what is good, is subordinated to a reason which adjudicates between competing pleasures with the view of securing tranquil lity of mind and body. But to do so is no easy task ; it makes the search for pleasure almost an impossibility Epicurus is more clearly in the right when he expatiates on the necessary interdependence of virtue and happiness : "We cannot live pleasantly without living wisely and nobly and righteously " Virtue is at least a means of happiness, though apart from that it is no good in itself, any more than mere sensual enjoyments, which are good only because they may sometimes serve to secure health of body and tranquillity of mind. The theory of Epicurus has no direct utilitarian tone. Its aim is the happiness of the individual. But its selfish ness is tempered by friendship. The only duties which Epicurus recognizes are those which have been free 1 } accepted on rational grounds, not from the compulsion of appetite or of circumstances. Thus the ideal of Epicurean society was the friendly circle. The family and the state imposed, as he thought, obligations which lessened the independence of man, and subjected him to externals. " The sage," he says. " will not marry and beget children, nor will he take part in state affairs. Though holding but little by many conventionalities, he will not assume a cynical or stoical indifference to others ; he will not form hard and fast judgments ; he will not believe all sinners to be equally depraved, nor all sages equally wise." Friend ship like the state in its first origin is based upon utility; but in it our relations are less forced; and though its motive be utility, still one must begin the good work of well-doing, even as the husbandman first bestows his labour and wealth upon the soil from which he hopes one day to receive fruit in return. Even in the lifetime of Epicurus we hear of the vast numbers of his friends, not merely in Greece, but in Asia and Egypt. The crowds of Epicureans were a standing enigma to the adherents of less popular sects. Cicero pondered over the fact; Arcesilaus explained the secession to the Epicurean camp, compared with the fact that no Epi curean was ever known to have abandoned his school, by saying that, though it was possible for a man to be turned into a eunuch, no eunuch could ever become a man. But
the phenomenon was not obscure. The doctrine has many