574 ETHICS 1. "I DEFINITION AND GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE 8UB- _) jCT. It is not easy to define in a single phrase the subject commonly called Ethics in such a manner as to meet with general acceptance ; as its boundaries and relations to cognate subjects are variously conceived by writers of different schools, and rather indefinitely by mankind in general. Nor does the derivation of the term help us much. Ethics (r)$<xu) originally meant that which relates to rjOos (" character ") ; the treatise of Aristotle s, however, to which the term was first applied, is not con cerned with character considered simply as character, but with its good and bad qualities. Indeed, the antithesis of "good" and "bad," in some form, is involved in all ethical affirmation ; and its presence constitutes a fundamental distinction between the science or study of ethics and any department of physical inquiry. Physics is concerned with what is, has been, or will be ; ethics with what is " good." or what " ought to be," and its opposite. We must add, however, that the good that ethics investigates i.s " good for man," to distinguish it from universal or abso lute good, which is the subject-matter of theology or ontology ; and again, if we are to separate ethics from politics, we must introduce a further qualification, and de fine the former as the study of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered as individuals. Neither of these distinctions, however, should be taken to imply a complete division of subjects ; and neither, it may be added, was reached at once and without effort in the development of ethical reflection. In Platonism we find Ethics and Ontology indissolubly blended ; and, indeed, in almost every philosophical system in which the universe is contemplated as having an ultimate end or Good, the good of human beings is conceived as somehow closely related to this Universal Good. So again the connexion between Ethics and Politics is naturally very intimate. We only know the individual man as a member of some society ; what we call his virtues are chiefly ex hibited in his dealings with his fellows, and his most prominent pleasures are derived from intercourse with them ; thus it is a paradox to maintain that man s highest good is independent of his social relations, or of the consti tution and condition of the community of which he forms a part. So, again, it would bo generally admitted that a statesman ought to aim at promoting the wellbeiug of his follow citizens considered as individuals; and if so, the in vestigation of the particulars of such wellbeing must be an integral part of politics. Still it is manifest that the good of an individual man can be separated as an object of study from the good of his community ; so that the ethical point of view has to be distinguished from the political, however large a field the two studies may have in common. When, however, we thus isolate in thought the individual man from his polity, the close connexion of Ethics with Psychology becomes manifest. It is plain that the chief good of man cannot consist in anything external and material, such as wealth ; nor even in mere bodily health and wellbeing, which experience shows to be compatible with extreme badness and wretchedness. And though it is perhaps true that goodness is commonly attributed to men from a consideration of the external effects of their conduct^ still it is generally held that a certain state of the agent s mind, a certain quality of disposition, motive, inten tion, or purpose, is essential to the perfect moral goodness of an action. Thus all (or almost all) ethical schools would agree that the main object of their investigation must belong to the psychical side of human life; whether they hold that Ultimate good is to be found in psychical existence regarded as merely sentient and emotional, identifying it with some species of desirable feeling or pleasure, or the genus or sum of such feelings, or whether they rather maintain that wellbeing of the mind must lie solely or chiefly in the quality of its activity. And when we attempt to work out either view into a clear and complete system, we are led inevitably to further psychological stucty, in order to examine different kinds and degrees of pleasure and pain, determine the nature and mutual relations of the different virtues or good qualities of character, and their opposites. So again, in discussing the fundamental question as to what is ultimately good or desirable, moralists are led to observe carefully what men actually do desire and aim at, and thus to analyse fully the process of voluntar} action, as well as the emotional states that precede and prompt to it. In fact it will appear that all important ethical notions are also psychological ; except the fundamental antithesis of "good" and "bad," or "right" and "wrong," with which psychology is not primarily concerned, any more than physics. The two antitheses just mentioned are frequently regarded as identical. And in fact it does not matter for ordinary purposes whether we speak of " right " or " good " con duct, " wrong" or " bad " motives. The common notion of what is Good for a human being even if we restrict it to what is" ultimately" good, or " good in itself" and not merely as a means to some further end includes more than the common notion of what is Eight for him, or his Duty. No doubt it is commonly believed that it will be ultimately best for a man to do his duty, and that this will promote his real Interest or Happiness ; but it does not follow that the notions of duty and interest are to be identified, or even that the connexion between the two may be scientifically demonstrated. The connexion is often regarded rather as a matter of faith; indeed many would hold that it is not undesirable that it should be somewhat obscure, in order that duty may be done as duty, and not from a mere calculation of self-love. Thus we arrive at another conception of ethics, in which it is viewed as concerned primarily with the principles of duty or the moral code, and only secondarily or perhaps not at all with the relation of duty to the agent s private happi ness. On this view 7 the study connects itself with theology, if the rules of duty are regarded as a code of divine legis lation; and apart from this reference it has a close affinity to rational or abstract jurisprudence. We might distinguish this as the modem view of ethics in contrast with the former, which was that of ancient Greek philosophy generally 1 , the transition between the two being due chiefly to the influence of Christianity, but partly also to that of Roman jurisprudence It is true that the thought of " the gods unwritten and unfaltering law" was not by any means absent from the moral reflection of Greece : still, the idea of Law was not taken as the ultimate and fundamental notion in any of the ancient ethical systems. These all proceed on the assumption that man, as a reasonable being, must seek his own highest good in this earthly life, and .therefore that any laws he has to obey must be demonstrated to bo means to the attainment of this good, or particulars in which it is realized. On this point the change produced by Christianity is even more striking, if we consider its more general effects rather than its influence on the minds that were most completely penetrated by its religious spirit. 1 To this statement a partial exception must be made as regards Stoicism, through which, in fact, as will presently appear, the transi
tion was partly made from the ancient to tlie modem manner of thought