766 E V O L II T I N cussioii of the nature and laws of organism in his last volume, The Physical Basis of Mind, might seem ever and again, by its sharp separation of organic and inorganic (mechanical) processes, to tell against the supposition of an evolution of life out of inorganic matter. J. J. Murphy. The question of the genesis of life and mind receives a peculiar treatment in Mr J. J. Murphy s Habit and Intelligence. In this work the teachings of the evolutionists are largely accepted, while an attempt is made to reconcile these with a teleological view of nature. The process of inorganic and of organic nature is each recognized as one of evolution ; but while the former is viewed as the result of mechanical principles, the latter is said to imply an intelligent or formative principle as well. Mechanical principles do indeed operate in organisms, this is the region of habit ; but over and above this, vital pro cesses involve a controlling intelligence. The author adopts the hypothesis that the Creator endowed vitalized matter at the first with intelligence under the guidance of which it organizes itself. Evolution is largely the result of this vital intelligent principle, only a small part being attributable to mechanical causes, such as natural selection. Evolution and Psyclwlacjy. The speculations of Mr Darwin and Mr Spencer have had a powerful influence on recent English psychology, which promises to become com parative, not only in the sense of including a comparison of ethnological mental characteristics, but also in the wider sense of bringing human intelligence into relation to that of the lower animals. Among writers who have laboured in this construction of a theory of mental evolution, mention must be made of the late Mr D. Spalding. 1 Again, Mr Chauncey Wright, in his remarkable essay The Evolution of 8elf -Consciousness (printed in a collec tion of his works), made a brilliant attempt to represent man s highest mental operations as evolved out of simple processes common to man and the lower animals. The influence of evolutional ideas is further traceable in the latest work of Mr A. Bain (Emotions and Will, 3d edition), and in the works of Dr Maudsley and other living psycho logists. The relation of the doctrine of evolution to psychology is handled in an essay by Mr J. Sully (Sensa tion and Intuition, ch. i.). Anthropology. The application of the doctrine of evolution to the question of man s origin and development has engaged the attention of a number of writers. In a sense all recent anthropologists and historians of culture may be said to have worked in this direction. Special attention must, however, be called to those writers who have sought directly to apply the fundamental ideas of evolution to these problems. Mr Bagehot s Physics and Politics is remarkable as illustrating the employment of the doctrine of natural selection in order to explain certain aspects of political progress. Still more important is the contribution made by Mr Fiske, in his Cosmic Philosophy, to the theory of man s origin and development. Mr Fiske s work is a full exposition of Mr Spencer s doctrine of evolution. In addition to this it contains interesting speculations respecting the steps by which man s distin guishing intelligence aud sociality were first acquired and afterwards developed. Relation to Ethics. The application of the doctrine of evolution to our ethical and religious ideas has engaged a number of writers. In Mr A. Barratt s Physical Ethics the development of man s moral sense out of feelings of pleasure and pain is traced in connexion with his organic and social evolution on which it is said to depend. By conceiving of all matter as endowed with sensibility 1 See an essay on 282 sq. " Instinct " in Macmillan s Magazine, vol. xxvii. p. (pleasure and pain), Mr Barratt is able to connect mairs moral evolution with the whole process of organic and of cosmic evolution. The idea of a natural growth of the moral sense out of simpler impulses aud instincts may also be frequently found in contemporary English literature. On the other hand, this consequence of the evolution theory has been strenuously opposed in the interests of a thorough going intuitive ethics as, for example, by Mr St George Mivart, in his work, The Genesis of Species, and by Mr 11. H. Huttou. 2 Again the question has been discussed whether the doc trine of evolution contributes towards the determination of the end or standard of morals. Mr Sidgwick has shown that it cannot well do this merely by proving how the moral sense has arisen. It is easy, however, to look upon the natural process as a tendency towards an end, and to conceive of our conscious actions as being bound by this tendency, so that the highest end of our existence must be to co-operate with the natural forces. This idea pervades a good deal of contemporary literature. It appears with special distinctness in the writings of Pro fessor Clifford 3 aud Mr F. Pollock 4 and in the able work of Miss Simcox on Natural Law. On the other hand, Mr H. Sidgwick 5 has made an elaborate study of the bearings of evolution on the ethical end, and reduces these to insignificant proportions. This writer criticises Mr Darwin s definition of the general good, and argues that the idea of a mere quantity of life is inadequate to supply a definite end of conduct Nevertheless life (^v) is the prime condition of wellbeing (ev rjv), and so far the evolu tionist is right in making life a secondary aim. The differentia of wellbeing, however, requires further inter pretation, which can only be supplied by the utilitarian principle. At the same time the doctrine of evolution guides us in the pursuit of this ultimate end, in so far as increase of happiness accompanies organic progress, or elevation in the scale of existence. Mr Sidgwick further points out how little the doctrine of evolution assists the utilitarian in dealing with social and political problems. lielation to Religion. The bearing of the doctrine of evolution on religion has formed the theme of a host of minor writings. On the whole, Mr Darwin s doctrine has been said (as it is by the author himself), not only to be compatible with the idea of an original creation of the world, but to supply a higher conception of the divine attributes than the hypothesis of special creations; on the other hand, Mr Spencer s doctrine, distinctly excluding as it does the idea of creative activity, has called forth strong opposition from a number uf theological writers, among whom the most powerful is certainly Professor Martineau. 1 In connexion with the subject of the relation of the evolu tion doctrine to religious ideas, it is worthy of remark that this doctrine appears to be serving as the starting-point for a new quasi-religious conception of nature. The idea of the cosmos and its forces as the author and source of our being easily lends itself to a kind of pantheistic sentiment towards nature. In Mr Spencer s own writings it is the 2 See Essays, vol. i. essay 3, " Science and Theism," in which it is said that "the Darwinian theory is quite incapable of explaining the specifically human phenomenon of the rise of what may be called an anti- Darwinian conscience, which restrains and subordinates the principle of competition." 3 See especially an article entitled " Eight and Wrong*" in the Fort nightly Heview, vol. xviii. new series, p. 794 sq.
- See an article on " Evolution and Ethics," in Mind, No. 3.
5 See an article headed "The Theory of Evolution in its relation to Practice," in Mind, No. 1 ; cf. Methods of Ethics, 2nd edition, pp. 69, 70 et passim. 6 See the pamphlet Modern Materialism, in which Professor TyndaU s version of evolution is severely criticised ; also an article "The Placo of Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man," Contemp. Rev., vol. xix. p.
606 sq.