460 FORTIFICATION covered two-thirds of the eastern fronts. On the north the Vistula runs about 260 yards from the covered-way, leav ing between the left bank and the glacis of the place an impracticable marsh intersected by canals ; at its embouch ure, distant nearly three miles, the banks were defended on the right by the fort of Weichselmunde, and on the left by an intrenched camp in the small island of Neufahrwasser, intended to cover and protect the arrival of such succours as might come from the seaward. The ground adjoining the banks of the Vistula being intersected by canals and covered with marshes, was extremely unfavourable to a besieger, as it rendered it difficult for him to form establish ments or raise works of proper solidity, and forced him to extend his quarters, disseminate his troops, and multiply his posts. At the period in question this inconvenience was the more severely felt, because the besieging force, though nominally 18,000 strong, was inferior in numbers to that of the garrison, which consisted of 12,000 Prussians and 3 Russian battalions, and it required the most vigilant caution to occupy numerous posts without unduly weak ening it. The communication between the place and the fort of Weichselmunde was maintained by a series of re doubts constructed on the borders of the Vistula, and parti cularly by the advantageous position of the isle of Holm, which continued the defence of the place to the fort with the exception of an interval of about 1400 yards, and ren dered the communication with Weichselmunde by the canal of Laack secure in spite of any batteries which the besiegers could establish at Schellmiihl. The French, therefore, could not attempt to throw a bridge over this part of the Vistula until they had made themselves masters of the isle of Holm. On the west two chains of hills, separated by the valley of Schidlitz, covered the enceinte ; and the pro longations of these hills were crowned by the two forts of Bischopsberg and Hagelsberg, which, being connected by intrenchments, formed a second enceinte, leaning upon one side on the inundation of the Mottlau, and upon the other on the left bank of the Vistula. This new enceinte, though constructed of earth and without revetment, was secure against assault, and as the covered-way as well as the foot of the scarps bristled with strong fraises which served instead of revetments, the besiegers had no hope of suc ceeding by a coup-de-main, and were therefore obliged to proceed by regular attack. From this description of the defences of Dantzic, it is easy to perceive that the difficulties attending the operalion must have been very great. The principal of these, as stated by General Kirgener, who until the arrival of General Chasseloup directed the attack, were, first, that Marshal Lefebvre had at first an army inferior to that of Marshal Kalkreuth, all of those destined for ths siege not having then arrived, and that this army was in a great measure composed of new troops ; secondly that, owing to the badness of the roads and the inclemency of the season, the artillery experienced the greatest difficulty in bringing up its convoys, the establishment of the batteries was re tarded, and a scarcity of ammunition sometimes prevailed ; thirdly, that the place, which could not be completely in vested because the approach from seaward was in the hands of the British, required an immense circumvallation, which, in fact, could not be completed until after the arrival of re inforcements ; the corps of troops which occupied the quar ters were extremely weak, and could neither furnish a sufficient number of workmen, nor even the number of men necessary for guarding the trenches ; and fourthly, that the besiegers had no good plan of the place, and did not know the depth of the ditches, and as the accidents of ground in front of the fortifications were extremely diversified, they could only be reconnoitred in proportion as the works advanced. These circumstances, joined to the necessity of concentrating the greater part of the troops close to the camp of Neufahrwasser, by which succours arriving by sea might debouch, and the advantage which the besieged had in retaining the mastery of part of the suburbs, determined the chief engineer, after the investment had been effected, to direct the principal attack against the Hagelsberg, and a false one against the Bischopsberg fort. The true point of attack was the long branch of lines in the plain connected with the bastion on the right of the Hagelsberg : " c e tait la le de"faut de la cuirasse ;" but, fqr the reasons above stated, approaches were directed against the fort itself. As the details of this great siege would fill a considerable volume, all that our limits permit is merely to indicate the principal occur rences. On the 1st of February 1807 the troops of General Dom- browski began to approach Dantzic, and took up a position at Mewe, upon the left bank of the Vistula. On the 15th General Menard, commanding the Baden contingent, arrived at the same f)oint, and repulsed a detachment of the garrison of Dantzic, which lad advanced from Dirschau to attack him On the 23d General Dombrowski, having been reinforced, received orders to attack a large detachment of the enemy which occupied an advantageous position at Dirschau and its environs. The combat here was obstin ate and sanguinary ; but the Prussians, though intrenched in a church and a churchyard, were dislodged and driven back, chiefly by the Poles, who, exasperated by their long resistance, put to death without mercy all who fell into their hands. After the combat of Dirschau, General Manstein no longer sought to obstruct the distant approaches. The troops destined to form the besieging army now arrived in succession, and the formation of the park of artillery was commenced. On the 12th of March Marshal Lefebvre found himself in a condition to close 111 on the place ; and the troops of the garri son having withdrawn, he distributed his own in the following positions: a battalion of French light infantry at Oliva, a Saxon battalion at St Halbrecht in the Burgerfeld, and two at Tiefensee and Kemlade ; the Poles occupied Schonfeld, Kowald, and Zunk- endin; some battalions took post at Wonnenberg, Neukau, Sehudel- kau, and Sniekau ; the Saxon cuirassiers and light horse were stationed at St Halbrecht and Guirsehkens ; the 19th regiment of French chasseurs at Burgfeld, and the 23d at Schudelkau ; the Baden dragoons and hussars at Wonnenberg, and the Polish lancers at Lan- genfurt. On the 16th the marshal attacked the village of Stolzen- berg, which he carried after a warm resistance, as lie did also the suburb of Schidlitz, to which the Prussians had retired ; and on the 18th the place was invested, with the exception of the eastern part, which, by the isle of Nehrung, communicated with Konigsberg. Field-marshal Kalkreuth now arrived in Dantzic, and assumed the command of the place. The next operation of the besiegers was the attack of the isle of Nehrung, which, after a severe and protracted struggle, was carried in the most gallant manner, and measures were immediately taken to secure the possession of this important con quest. A bridge was also established on the Vistula, and various works constructed to check the attempts of the enemy either on the side of Dantzic or on that of Pillau. At this time the governor, who had under his command agarrison of 18,000 men, besides the burgher militia, made a sortie for the purpose of destroying the works of the besiegers ; but the attempt failed, and the Prussian columns were compelled to retreat into the place without having obtained the smallest success upon any point. It had been decided that the principal attack should be directed against the fort of Hagelsberg (because the redoubt of Bischopsberg- was more complete and better flanked by the fire of the place), fav oured by two false attacks, the one directed against the intrenched camp at Neufahrwasser, and the other against Bischopsberg, and by two secondary attacks on the left bank of the river; and ground was broken on the night of the 1st and 2d April, at the distance of 1600 yards from the palisades. The approaches were pushed forward with the greatest vigour, and on the night of the llth the second parallel was commenced by flying sap. On the morning of the 12th the batteries were armed. On the 13th the enemy made a sortie in force, attacked the Saxons with great impetu osity, carried a redoubt constructed upon the mamelon of Hagels berg, and penetrated even to the head of the trenches ; but they were ultimately repulsed, though not without difficulty and loss. By the 23d all the batteries of the first and second parallels, and those of Stolzenberg, were armed, and emplacements were provided for field howitzers, from which to throw shells into all quarters of the city. At daybreak on the 23d the batteries were unmasked, and, though the garrison returned the fire with the greatest vivacity, by the 24th the besiegers, firing with 56 heavy guns, had obtained the ascendency, committing great ravages in the place. Being apprised of this circumstance, Marshal Lefebvre summoned the governor, who replied in a manner worthy of himself. The fire of the mor tar and reverse batteries continued during the 25th, in the course of which a new battery was constructed between the low flanks of the
