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alien and extra claim, apart from his household government or family care.
That this is a desperate position for a woman to be in; that if she has voluntarily incurred it, she deserves much suffering; that by every possible means, separation between married persons should be discouraged—are all incontrovertible truths. But it is also an incontrovertible truth that justice should be made possible for her, even in this false position. That, failing her natural protector, the law should have power to protect. That some direct court of appeal should exist, in which (according to Lord Thurlow's principle in graver cases) the circumstances of each case should guide its result, and the law exercise remedial control. It is vain to say, "Let the woman find sureties." Suppose her friendless; suppose her without sureties; suppose the husband to refuse all agreement. It is equally vain to say, "Let her sue for alimony;" she may not be in a position to sue for alimony:—or to say, "Let her institute proceedings for divorce against her husband;" that also may be impossible. What remains (failing these) is the doubtful claim of the creditor against the husband; which is, in fact, a side-winded means of establishing the wife's claim. It is an indirect and imperfect mode of legislating for her anomalous position, instead of a direct and perfect mode; which might exist—in a court authorized to decide on the circumstances, and award an allowance—and might exist in the shape of private appeals (as many other matters relating to property are already decided). The present method of establishing the wife's claim, through the claim of the creditor, is public, odious, scandalous, and uncertain; unjust to the creditor, and unjust to the wife. The other method might be private, decent, and decisive; and make the wife herself, responsible to the creditor, after making the husband responsible to her. It would be, as Mr Phillimore said on that other matter—taking out of the sphere of private animosity, caprice, or revenge, that which never ought to be left to private animosity, caprice, or revenge—and
