who could understand and appreciate our fight for freedom; what has driven him to hate us?"
I could only repeat such "explanation" as I had been able to offer before to their compatriots of the mountains.
The colonel was kind enough to suggest how much I might have saved England had I been here a year ago.
"It is very doubtful," I answered, "whether I could have done much, even then. Our Government makes up its own mind without listening to outside information. As a matter of fact, Colonel Aubrey Herbert, a recognised authority on the Near East, called twice at 10, Downing Street, to urge that very scheme upon the Premier's private secretary, Mr. Philip Kerr, but they preferred to keep me in England."
"But why is your 'intelligence' so badly managed?" he asked.
"What evidence can you produce for such an assumption?" was my retort.
"There could surely be no other explanation of your leaving the Greeks without support . . . unless, indeed, they are right who whisper that Mr. Lloyd George actually wanted the opposing armies to exterminate each other. His conduct, certainly, lent colour to the charge."
But I refused to be drawn. . . . "'Intelligence' is not my province," I answered, "although I can say that the Turks were not served much better in that respect. . . . They won by 'faith'; what we of the West call 'superstition.'"
I was able to more or less look after the son of an eminent Turkish lady writer during his studies in Paris, just after the Treaty of Sèvres. His father, one of the leading Governors under the last administration, had given up all to follow M. Kemal Pasha. When I asked the boy whether they had any hope of success, he just flashed out: "They must succeed. His stars are 'right.' He could not fail!"
On the other hand, Turkish diplomats, one and all, declared he would fail.
