are themselves objective principles realized outwardly. But, nevertheless, one must not conclude a priori that the stages of the two treatments are necessarily the same. Assuming that the two works are consistent, one is justified in supplementing the analysis of a principle in one from the analysis of the other; for example, one can use the discussion of the moral consciousness in the Phenomenology to amplify the discussion in the Philosophy of Right of the kind of realization obtained by moral will which takes moral principles to be supreme. But one must not assume that the phase of mind which succeeds the moral consciousness is simply the embodiment of the next ethical category. The Phenomenology has to take into account a further inter-play of subject and object which is not necessary to the direct analysis of categories. The other point is a qualification of this. When he wrote the Phenomenology Hegel had in the main reached his final position, but the principles of his thought still required to be worked out and were subject to revision. I doubt if the division of the categories of mind which he finally adopted was altogether clear to him at this time, and this is borne out by certain changes of terminology. The word ‘mind’ is used in the Phenomenology to denote what is later called objective mind, and the account of the development of practical mind into objective mind, given with great care in the Encyclopaedia, does not appear in the Phenomenology. The Phenomenology is a ‘voyage of discovery’, and the first survey of the country travelled is not quite accurate. I think that if Hegel had written the Phenomenology when the plan of the Encyclopaedia was clear in his mind, the correspondence of the stages of the two works would have been closer at certain points.
Another writing which stands by itself is the Propaedeutik, a transcript of the lectures which Hegel dictated in philosophy from 1808 to 1811 to the higher classes of the Gymnasium at