THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY 169
Hegel distinguishes the two aspects as purpose and intention; and intention is the second category of morality.
There are two sides to this principle. On the one hand, it is more objective than purpose. It co-ordinates the various aspects of its content, and takes some account of objective connexions which are overlooked at the lower level. That is to say, in declaring more plainly why an act is done and exposing the ulterior motive, an analysis of a man's intention indicates more truly what it is that occurs. If a man intentionally sets a forest on fire, we obtain a very inadequate account of the event if we are content to discover that he kindled the few leaves or twigs from which the fire may have originated. We ought also to see the connexion between these leaves or twigs and the rest of the wood; and, if we would know what was the moral fact which really took place, we must note that behind the immediate purpose of producing a few sparks there was the intention to produce the widespread conflagration. The intention is the purpose made more comprehensive, more objective, more far-seeing, and in that sense more rational.
On the other hand, intention is more subjective than purpose; it transcends the immediacy of the latter on both sides. As it takes more account of the relations of things, so it expresses a wider area of the self. It is more deeply rooted in the individual character of the agent; it is less a casual and momentary phase of his life, and more the realization of a permanent tendency of his being. And so to gratify a man's intentions is to satisfy the relatively general ends on which he sets store. On this subjective side we can call the satisfaction of intention well-being or happiness. It includes 'the particularity of the subject', the tenor of his special structure and function as this individual.
Morality demands that action should be estimated from this point of view; we have to take into account the wider end for the sake of which any particular action is performed. Thus in the case of a crime, e. g. murder, the claim of the moral consciousness requires us to consider whether or not the murder was performed for the sake of something else; and it insists that the moral quality depends on the ultimate intention. The murder, it is argued, as a particular obnoxious effect, was undoubtedly before the mind of the agent, but
