and the implicit self, and the moral intention fails because it misrepresents the immanent end. Hegel indicates the abstractness of justification through intention by showing how easily the conception is perverted into its opposite. When we begin to divide the inward aspect, the ulterior motive, from the outward accomplishment, we inevitably trace the real purpose to some petty, finite, and unworthy element. If we take our stand on the abstract moral standpoint, that of duty, we cannot avoid the conclusion that no act is done for duty's sake; for such a bare purpose is nothing real. The effective end is therefore taken to be the particular, the non-moral. This is the 'psychological view of history which minimizes and disparages all great deeds and individuals. It exalts the inclinations and passions which found satisfaction within the substantial reality, as, e.g., fame and honour, &c.—in general the particular aspect which it has beforehand decreed to be bad—to the highest position, and regards them as the actuating motives of what is done.'[1] This is not the ethical point of view; it is the judgement of the valet 'for whom there are no heroes, not for lack of heroes, but because he is only a valet.'[2] This attitude is itself base and mean; it is not the truth of the situation.[3] The whole point of view is insufficient. The right of objectivity has been ignored and an abstraction set up in place of the whole self in its concrete activity. We are not justified in picking out special contents as the essence of action, to proclaim them either good or bad; and the philosophic judgement must consider the total act in all its bearings. We have a right, from this higher point of view, to the substantial worth of our acts, and are also indissolubly bound up with their deficiencies. We are not morally responsible for the whole; but moral responsibility is an abstraction.
The right to be judged by one's insight, and to have within one the knowledge of the good as good, is also abstract. Against the claim that what we consider right is right for us, there arises the claim of objectivity that what is absolutely right must be known by us. It is not enough to be sincere: our sincerity must be well informed. We are untrue to ourselves if our ideals are repudiated by the nature of things, and our moral righteousness is unethical. We must win our self-
