that view does, indeed, apply, in a limited extent, to the first of these two: since if when a man judges an action to be right or wrong, he is always merely making an assertion about the feelings of his own society, it will follow that two men, who belong to different societies, can never possibly differ in opinion as to whether an action is right or wrong. But this objection does not apply as between two men who both belong to the same society. The view that when any man asserts an action to be right he is merely making an assertion about the feelings of his own society, does allow that two men belonging to the same society may really differ in opinion as to whether an action is right or wrong. Neither this view, therefore, nor the view that we are merely asserting that some man or other has a particular feeling towards the action in question involves the absurdity that no two men can ever differ in opinion as to whether an action is right or wrong. We cannot, therefore, urge the fact that they involve this absurdity as an objection against them, as we could against the view that each man is merely talking of his own feelings.
