say that the one set is related to some mind or minds in a way in which the other is not related. That is to say, while admitting that to call an action right or wrong is not merely to assert that some particular mental attitude is taken up towards it, they hold that to call a thing “good” or “bad” is merely to assert this. And of course, if it be true that no action ever can be right unless its total effects are as good as possible, then this view as to the meaning of the words “good” and “bad” will contradict the principle we are considering in this chapter as effectively as if the corresponding view be held about the meaning of the words “right” and “wrong.” For if, in saying that one set of effects A is better than another B we merely mean to say that A has a relation to some mind or minds which B has not got, then it will follow that a set of effects precisely similar to A will not be better than a set precisely similar to B, if they do not happen to have the required relations to any mind. And hence it will follow that even though, on one occasion or in one Universe, it is right to prefer A to B, yet, on another occasion or
