those which have been held with regard to the meaning of “right” and “wrong,” is that in the former case it has been very often held that what we mean by calling a thing “good” is that it is desired, or desired in some particular way; and this attitude of “desire” is one that I did not mention in the case of “right” and “wrong” because, so far as I know, nobody has ever held that to call an action “right” is the same thing as to say that it is desired. But the commonest of all views with regard to the meaning of the word “good,” is that to call a thing good is to say that it is desired, or desired for its own sake; and curiously enough this view has been used as an argument in favour of the very theory stated in our first two chapters, on the ground that no man ever desires (or desires for its own sake) anything at all except pleasure (or his own pleasure), and that hence, since “good” means “desired,” any set of effects which contains more pleasure must always be better than one which contains less. Of course, even if it were true that no man ever desires anything except
