consequences; namely, the objection that there are certain kinds of action which ought absolutely always and quite unconditionally to be done or avoided. But there still remain two other objections, which are so commonly held, that it is worth while to consider them.
The first is the objection that right and wrong depend neither upon the nature of the action, nor upon its consequences, but partly, or even entirely, upon the motive or motives from which it is done. By the view that it depends partly upon the motives, I mean the view that no action can be really right, unless it be done from some one motive, or some one of a set of motives, which are supposed to be good; but that the being done from such a motive is not sufficient, by itself, to make an action right: that the action, if it is to be right, must always also either produce the best possible consequences, or be distinguished by some other characteristic. And this view, therefore, will not necessarily contradict our principle so far as it asserts that no action can be right, unless it produces the best possible consequences: it only contradicts that part of
