would turn out well, is not that his action was right, but rather that he is not to blame. And it may be fully admitted that in such a case he really ought not to be blamed; since blame cannot possibly serve any good purpose, and would be likely to do harm. But, even if we admit that he was not to blame, is that any reason for asserting also that he acted rightly? I cannot see that it is; and therefore I am inclined to think that in all such cases the man really did act wrongly, although he is not to blame, and although, perhaps, he even deserves praise for acting as he did.
But the same difficulty may be put in another form, in which there may seem an even stronger case against the view that right and wrong depend on the actual consequences. Instead of considering what judgment we ought to pass on an action after it has been done, and when many of its results are already known, let us consider what judgment we ought to pass on it beforehand, and when the question is which among several courses still open to a man he ought to choose. It is admitted that he cannot
