if we give to these words the precise sense which our theory gave to them.
I conclude, then, that the theory stated in Chapters I and II is right so far as it merely asserts the three principles (1) That there is some characteristic which belongs and must belong to absolutely all right voluntary actions and to no wrong ones; (2) That one such characteristic consists in the fact that the total consequences of right actions must always be as good, intrinsically, as any which it was possible for the agent to produce under the circumstances (it being uncertain, however, in what sense precisely the word “possible” is to be understood), whereas this can never be true of wrong ones; and (3) That if any set of consequences A is once intrinsically better than another set B, any set precisely similar to A must always be intrinsically better than a set precisely similar to B. We have, indeed, not considered all the objections which might be urged against these three principles; but we have, I think, considered all those which are most commonly urged, with one single exception. And I must now
