822 FEDERAL REPORTER. �Second. The claim of the Unitei States wonld also seem to be barred by the limitation prescribed by the act of June 22, 1874. Sec- tion 21 of that act (1 Supp. Rev. St. 81) shows, by its language, that it was designed to apply to past liquidations. It declares "that whenever any goods, etc., sfiall have been entered, etc., and whenever any duties upon any imported goods, etc., shall have been liquidated and paid, etc., such settlement of duties shall, after the expiration of one year from the time of entry, in the absence of fraud, etc., be final and conclusive on all parties." �At the time of the passage of this act the government had, under former decisions, been allowed to reliquidate the duties against the importer, without any limitation of time. Such reliquidation was a necessary preliminary to any remedy for deficiency under a preceding erroneous liquidation, ihis section of the act of 1874 is, therefore, in the nature of a statute of limitations. It applies to the government, and limits its remedies, after settlement, to a period within one year from the date of entry. U. S. v. Phelps, 17 Blatchf. 312, 316. Such statutes, where the prohibitory language is general, as in this case, apply to past as well as future transactions, unless the contrary intent is manifest. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596. The intent of section 21 of this act to include past transactions seems clear from the words above quoted. But inasmuch as "one year from the date of entry" had already elapsed at the time the act was passed, the rule of construction, as sustained in the case last cited, must be that the time of limitation shall "commence when the cause of action is first subjected to the operation of the statute." Upon this construction the government had but one year after the act of June 22, 1874, took efieot, in which to make its reliquidation and commence suit. �It is urged that section 26 of that act declares that "nothing herein contained shall afiect existing rights of the United States." But it is impossible to hold, as it seems to me, that the effeet of this saving clause is to nullify every specifie clause in the act, when a right of the United States is affected. The act relates to several different subjects, and many of its provisions modify, more or less, rights formerly existing. Section 16 expressly applies to suits "now pend- ing," and the existing rights of the United States in such suits were greatly affected thereby through a submission to the jury of the question of actual intent to defraud. "Acts and parts of acts incon- sistent with the provisions of this act are repealed;" and then comes the saving clause as to "existing rights." The general words of thi» ��� �
