CAMPBKIiL V. CRAMPTON. 427 �and has never been questioned by the courts of this state. See, also, Perry v. Perry, 2 Paige, 501. �It must be held, therefore, that the consanguinity of the parties would not render their marriage a voidable marriage in this state. But it by no means foUows that an agreement to marry between persons thus related will be tolerated. It is one thing to adjudge that after marriage the consanguinity of the parties cannot be invoked to annul the marriage, and quite another to decide whether an agreement for marriage between persons so nearly related should be sanctioned. In the one case the bastardizing of the issue, and the unsettling of successions, would furnish decisive reasons why the mar- riage should not be annuUed. When the parties have not con- summated their agreement these reasons cannot apply. �Notwithstanding the extensive research of counsel no case has been found which determines whether an agreement for a marriage between a nephew and aunt is obnoxious as con- travening morality or public policy. Such marriages are expressly prohibited by the civil law, by the laws of England, and by the statutes of many of our own states. Where such marriages are prohibited the question would not arise, be- cause it would not be attempted to recover damages for the breach of an unlawful contract; and it is not improbable that the question has not been presented to the courts of the states where there is no statutory prohibition, because such marriages are felt to be so unnatural and revolting that they have been very rare, and but few persons have been found willing to contemplate such a union. �The peculiar circumstances of the present case went far to justify the jury in an attempt to punish the defendant. He was a man of education, a physician of prominence, many years the senior of the plaintiff, and, having overcome lier scruples against the engagement, held her to her promises until she had lost her youth and health, and sacrificed her prospects in life; and the jury, doubtlesa, were satisfied that she brought this action rather to punish him for his selfish and dishonorable treatment than to obtain pecuniary recom- pense for her own injury. These considerations, of course, ����
