BTTlNa ». MAEX'S BXBOUTOB. 6^9 �princîple of analogies, and act on considerations pecu^iar to themselves; that is to say, "on their own inherent doc- trine of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands, by refusing to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or long and unreasonable acqui- escence in the assertion of adverse rights." 2 Story 's Eq. Jur. 1520. �Thus, to recapitulate, there are three classes of cases with reference to the bar of time — First, those in ■which equity is bound to apply the statutes of limitations; second, those in which it merely acts in analogy to those statutes ; and, thîrd, those in which it is neither bound by nor acts upon the prin- ciple of analogy to them, but proceeds on doctrines peouliar to and inherent in itself. �The present is not a case of the first class. It is not a case in which the jurisdiction of law and equity is concurrent, and in which the complainants might have gone into one court or the other at option. It is a suit between cestuis que trust and a trustee; a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of equity; for, though the law courts have jurisdiction in a few cases of the simpler trusts, yet, in general, equity has exclusive juris- diction over trusts. "Estates vested in persons upon partic- ular trusts and confidences are wholly without cognizance at common law, and the abuses of such trusts and confidences are beyond the reach of any legal process." 1 Story's Eq. Jur. 29. �It is elementary law that trusts are exclusively within the cognizance of equity. The present is not, therefore, a case of concurrent jurisdiction of law and equity, and is not one in which I am hound by the statutes of limitations. Màny, and, indeed, most of the suits in chancery, in which the trustee and cestui que trust are parties on one side, and othera are parties in adverse interest on the other, rank in the first class of cases that bave been mentioned, where equity is bound by the statutes of limitations. An instance of such cases was that of Livesay v. Holms, 14 Grat. 4el. A widow had qualified as administratrix of her husband, and taken possession of and held slaves, in which she claimed a life ����
