690 FEDERAL SEPOBTES. �faots, there is another which depends for its decision upon facts ■whieb are controverted. It is alleged in the answer that the plaintiff well knew that the enterprise in which respondents had embarked "inyolved the crossing of plaintiff's road at or near the point of crossing aforesaid, and that the place and manner of said crossing, as aforesaid, were fuUy explained to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff expressly assented to and approved the place and manner of cross- ing as aforesaid, and represented to the defendants, and gave them to understand, that they coidd and should be permitted to build and operate the said Barnesville & Moorhead Eailroad across the «aid plaintiff's road at the place aforesaid when- ever and as soon as they desired so to do, and that they would assist in effecting such crossing, and that no obstacle would be interposed thereto; and that after such representations and license, and in firm reliance upon the same, and without and before any notice or knowledge that the said representations •would not be carried eut in good faith, or of any design on the part of the plaintiff to interpose any obstacles whatever to such crossing, or to attempt so to do, the said defendant com- panies went on and expended large sums of money in the construction of said road, to-wit, several hundred thousand dollars, " etc. These allegations are denied by certain affida- vits filed by complainant; but it is manifest that the ques- tion of fact thus presented eannot be iinally decided until the final hearing upon the testimony. The right of the complain- ant to damages for the crossing of its track on the land above described, by the respondents' railroad, depends upon the docision of these several questions, some of which are by no means free from difSculty, and one of which (the last named) eannot be finally determined until the final hearing. In such a case the usual course is to continiie the injunction in force, and thus keep the parties in statu quo until the final hearing. But this rule bas its exceptions. Courts of equity will some- times substitute a bond of indemnity for an injunction, if the ends of justice will thereby be'promoted, and especially if any public interest may suffer by continuing the injunction in force pending the litigation. There are several cogent rea- ����
