18 FEDSBÀli BSFOBTBB. �ton, supra, the woman was never in the United States until after the death of her husband, and in neither case does it appear that the^e waa any evidence that the women held to be citizens, by reason of their marriage with citizens, possessed the qualifications of good moral character, attachment to the principles of the constitution, and disposition to the good order and happiness of the United States. The reasonable inference is that, notwithstanding the letter of the statute, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," the supreme court considered that it was only necessary that the wornan should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect to the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen. And, tried by this test, it is quite likely that she will be found as well qualified, person- ally, as her husband, or the thousands of poor, ignorant, and unknown aliens who are yearly admitted to citizenship, in the larger eenters of foreign population, by the local courts of practically their own creation. �The stipulation in this case is silent as to the qualifications of the plaintiff, except that she is a native of Switzerland, and was married to an American citizen in 1875, and has since resided in Oregon ; and, if it must appear affirmatively that she possessed the qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization, then it does not appear that she is or ever was a citizen of the United States. Indeed, it does not appear certainly that she belongs to the class or race of per- sons who "might be lawfully naturalized;" for, although she is a native of Switzerland, it does not folio w from that f act that she is either a free white person, or one of African descent or nativity. But, on the argument, it was practically admitted that she was a free white person, and the stipula- tion may be amended in this respect accordingly. As to the other qualifications, my conclusion is, upon the authorities and the reason, if not the necessity of the case, that the statute must be construed as in efifect deolaring that an alien ����
