Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/621

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IN EE LONG ISLAND, ETC., TRANSPOETATION 00. 609 �principle is, as it seems to me, the enforcement of a lien for repairs to a domestic vessel created by the state law in a case where the maritime law gives no lien. The lien thus created is purely the creation of the local statute. It is not a mari- time lien. ,Yet, because the contract to which it is made appartenant is a maritime contract, the admiralty court has jurisdiction of the case, and will adopt, for the purpose of enforcing the right thus given to the party, such of its pro- cessess as are appropriate for securing to the owner the ben- efit of it. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 580. The title to ships passes, as in cases of other chattels, to an administrator. But if any state should choose to enact that the title to an interest in a vessel held by its citizens should on their death, intestate, pass like real estate to their heirs at law, I know of no ground on which a court of admiralty could refuse to recognize the title so made. A doubt has been expressed by the supreme court in one case whether such a statutory action for a marine tort will lie in the admiralty. Steam-boat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 532. The case, however, did not call for the decision of the question, as the court observed. In the case of Crapo v. Allen, ut supra, Judge Sprague, while holding that the statute had no appli- cation to the party before him because not within the juris- diction of the state, expressed the opinion that such an action in personam would not lie. But notwithstanding these author- ities, which certainly are not conclusive against it, I have reached the conclusion that a court of admiralty can, in the absence of any conflicting legislation on the part of congress, enforce such statutory claim for damages in personam for a marine tort; that such is the proper and logical resuit of the principle which leads the admiralty courts always in the exercise of their jurisdiction to recognize and enforce the rights of the parties to maritime contracts created by any competent authority. And I can see nothing in the rules of the admiralty applicable to torts which should except them from the like beneficiai principle. Nor does there seem to be any valid distinction in this respect as to the powers of the court between suits in personam and suits in rem. In v.5,no.7— 39 ' ����