Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/637

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m EE LONG ISLAND, ETC., TEANSPOETATION CO. 625 �tion that in ail maritime causes, of whioh this is one, it is wholly within the discretion of congress to make the juris- diction of the courts of the United States exclusive, and that this statute does make it exclusive for the purpose of deter- mining the question of the existence and extent of the owner's liability for the disaster from the time of the transfer of the property to a trustee after the filing of the petition, (Kev. St. § 4285,) and that congress has not seen fit to provide for a trial by jury in the admiralty courts, exeept in a limited form in the circuit court. 18 St. 315, c. 77. The statute expressly says that from and after such transfer "ail claims and pro- ceedings against the owner shall cease." This language has been held by this court to mean that ail suits for such dam- ages shall cease, {The Oceanus, 6 Ben. 258;) and so the supreme court evidently understood it when they f ramed their rules under the act, and made a restraining order a regular part of the proceedings. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 125 ; Eule 54, 13 Wall, 13. Although the decision of this court was not foUowed by the supreme court of Massachusetts, it seems to me to be clearly right, and will be adhered to unless overruled. Hill Manuf'g Co. v. Steamship Co. 113 Mass. 495. The construction of the statute and of the rules suggested by the Massachusetts court, that the claims and proceedings that are to cease are only those pending in the federal courts, would, it seems to me, in effect, nullify the statute and destroy its intended operation in case any claimant of damage had been diligent enough to commence his action in the state court before the filing of the petition in the district court. And the fifty-f ourth ruie, as interpreted by this court, — that is, as applying to suits commenced in state courts, — ^is in exact accordance with the declared intention of the supreme court as to the rules they had prepared, but had not then promul- gated. Norwich Co. v. Wright, ut supra, 125. It is not neces- sary to claim that, after a determination by the district court upon the question of liability, if in favor of th« owner, the dis- trict court can or would, by its final decree, restrain any parties from going on with or commencing any suit against the owner. It may be that after a decree the owners must v.6,no.7— 40 ����