IN KE LONG ISLAND, ETC., TEANSPORTATION CO. G29 �therefore, the same reasons of public policy in this case, as in the cases more particulary provided for in section 720, for prohibiting the issue of the injunction or restraining order. It does not interfere with any exercise of jurisdiction which could otherwise be claimed by the state court, and is not likely to lead to unseemly conflicts between the federal and the state tiibunals, to prevent which is understood to have been the original purpose of this prohibitory legislation. So positive is the language of section 4285, that it may be doubted whether, after the transf er therein provided for, the state court could make any order whatever in the cause, even one restraining the plaintiff from its further prosecution. On the ■whole, therefore, construing the two sections together, I think this court may still restrain, by its order pending this suit, parties who bave commenced actions in the state court from proceeding further therein. It is understood that the supreme court will at the present term promulgate new rules regulating the practice in this class of cases. If, in view of the changes made in revising the statutes, they change this rule 80 as to except suits in the state courts from the restraining order to be issued, these parties will, upon the basas of that modification of the rules, have an early opportunity to renew this motion to*vacate the restraining order as to them. If the court continues in force that rule as it now is, it will be a strong if not conclusive authority that section 720 of the Eevised Statutes makes no change in the rule necessary. And, -whatever doubt there may be about this point of statu- tory construction, it is satisfactory to feel that no harm is done by the restraining order, since, if it were vacated, these parties would be still prohibited by the act of congress from going on with their suits. �The suggestion that the cour^ which first obtains jurisdic- tion of a matter has the right to go on and determine the cause, has no force in a case where by a valid statute a court subsequently obtaining jurisdiction is vested with exclusive jurisdiction. And the further suggestion, that the state courts are competent to give the relief to which the owners are en- titled, has no force, because no such jurisdiction is given to ����
