■713 PEDEBAIi REPOSTER. �1,20 ; RohUns V. FuUeh, 2a .N. I.' 6 70, 673. And this is par- ticularly so after institution of legal procôedings, when the power arises ratherfrom. general practice in actions at law ihan from privileges of partnership ; for.it is generally true that one plaintiff ta&y lele&se an action birought by two. Coll. Part. §§ 441, 636. No càBe that I have seen suggests that a surviving partner is deprived of this power td release a debt either before or after action brought. In Robbins v. Fid- 1er, supra, the court say : "The partners may, notwithstanding the disolution, still perfdrm any act relating to debts and con- tracts existing before dissolution which they might have per- formed as partners before the dissolutioh, such as releasing or giving a receipt for partnership debt, signing abankrupt's certificate, etc. The signing of a bankrupt's certificate is the highest exertion of authority referred to, for it releases the debtor and dischargea his future acquisitions, but the power fco do it is well.eatablished." Page 573. And see Arton v. Booth, 4 J. B. Moore, 192; S. C. 16 E. G. L. 373, which is a «strong illustration of the power to release after dissolution. Partners are more notably bound by the acts of each other in proceedings under the bankrupt laws. One may, on behalf of ail, prove a debty vote in the ohoice of assignees, and sign the certificate. Coll. Part. §§ 444, 467; 3 Kent, 49; Pars. Part. 172, note w, at page 175; Eden, Banky. 397, in 25 hayf hihvMy, 392; Ex parte Hodgkinson, 19 Ves. 291; Ex parte Mitchell,'14 Ves. 597; Ex parte Hall, 17 Ves. 62; and other cases cited in Mr. Sumner's notes to these cases in Vesey. ■ - �In this last case, Ex parte Hall, it was the signature of the certificate by one partner after a dissolution. In ail the cases cited, and màny others examined, while I find no case ruling the point as to a surviving partner,! find none taking a dis- jijnction againat him in this matter of assenting to a dis- charge ; and, inasmuch as his title is enlarged, and he is more exclusively and entirely niaster of the assets than before dissolution, or after dissolution, otherwise than by death, it would seem that he would have, as surviving part- ner, in th' s respect, the same power as thfit given him in the ����
