876 FEDERAL REPORTER. �tracts on which said indebtedness rests. The intent is too obvious for controversy. Indeed, they not only manifest a clear intent to embarrass creditors by taking from them their remedies, but they evince unusual adroitness and skill to insure the resuit eontemplated. If the legislature, as hereto- fore stated, had simply withdrawu the power of taxation contained in its charter, leaving the corporation intact, this court could, upon the authority of Memphis v. U. S. and Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, supra, have lawf ully ignored said enactments, and have compelled the proper officers of the city to have levied, assessed, and collected taxes sufficient to liqui- date complainants' debts; or, if the new corporation — the taxing district — had been invested with authority to levy and collect taxes, etc., the courts could compel it to do what its predecessor ought to have done, to-wit : to levy, collect, and apply the taxes realized to the payment of complainants' demands. Broughton v. Pensaeola, 93 U. S- 266 ; and Mount Pleasant v.Beekwitk, 100 U. S. 514. �But the draughtsman of these statutes skillfuly evaded these adjudications — First, by extinguishing the old munieipality and resolving its inhabitants back into the body of the state ; secondly, creating another and different corporation to take its place, and withholding from it the power of taxation ; thirdly, providing that the taxes for the support of this sub- stituted munieipality should be levied direotly by the gen- erai assembly and paid into the state treasury, leaving no one on whom judicial authority can be exerted in favor of cred- itors. But these statutes are none the less invalid because they have been so framed as to elude the power of the courts. Although prohibited by the constitution from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, or divesting vested rights without compensation, the prohibition may be, in some instances, as in this, successfuUy evaded. The constitution of the state declares that courts shall be always open for the redress of wrongs. This constitutional provision is impera- tive on every legislator who takea an oath to support that instrument. Yet if the, legisla tors were, notwithstanding their oaths, to pass an act abrogating the courts, the law would be ����
