WILSON V. COON. 619 �bas claimed as new more than he had a right to claim, or where the description, specification, or claim is defective or insufficient ; but he cannot, nnder such an application, make material additions to the invention -which were not described', suggested, nor substantially indicated in the original specifi- cations, drawings, or patent-office model." These remarks were made in regard to section 13 of the act of 1836, and they recognize that an insufficient description, or an insuffi- cient claim, or both, may be amended in particulars substan- tially indicated in the original specification or drawings or model. They give no countenance to the view that this can- not be done if the claim of the original patent is a good Qne, on a description sufficient to sustain it. �The case of OUI v. WeUs, 22 Wall. 1, arose under the act of 1836, on a re-issue, in 1868, of the same patent that was involved in Burr v. Duryee. In that case the specification of the re-issue differed from that of the original in leaving out the whole description of the chamber or tunnel, and its ap- pendages, and substituting a full description of other devicea different from the chamber, in form at least, to perforin the functions of the chamber and its appendages, as described in the original. Material matters "were left out of the specifica- tion of the re-issue, when compared with the original, and new features were introduced in the description of the devices to be employed in guiding the fibers of the fur when takeii from the feeding mechanism by the rotating brush or picker, such devices being different in form, and with different names from those described in the original specification as the means to accomplish the same end. It was held that this made the re-issue invalid. Much is said in the opinion in GUI v. WeUs that was unnecessary to the decision in that case, and what was so said seems to have been disregarded by the same court in the subsequent case of The Corn Planter Patent, 23 Wall. 181, which there sustained re-issued patents on the sole ground that the re-issues were for things contained within the machines and apparatus described in the original patents, against the dissenting opinion of the judge who delivered the opinion of the court in GUI v. Wells, and who sought to apply ��� �
