Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 6.djvu/735

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LOCKWOOD V. CLBAVELAND. I23 �cjoss-bill, praying that the comiilainant's patent might be declared void, and that he might be restrained from bringing any action in any court for an infringement of the same. �The counsel for the eomplainant in the original suit now asks the court to dismiss the eross-bill, on the ground that section 4918 of the Eevised Statutes affords ail the relief in the original suit which the defendant can possibly have in the cross-suifc. The motion involves the true construction of that section, which is a substantial re-enactment of section 16 of the patent act of 1836, as amended by section 10 of the act of Maroh 3, 1839. It provides that, "whenever there aie interfering patents, any person interested in any one of them

  • * * may have relief against the interfering patentee,

and ail parties interested under him, by suit in equity against the owners of the interfering patent, and the court, on notice to adverse parties, and other due proceedings had according to the course of equity, may adjudge and declare either of the patents void, in whole or in part. * ♦ *" The design of the provision is obvious. The congress meant to give a speedy and complete remedy to the owners of interfering pat- ents, and, to this end, to clothe the courts with jurisdiction to adjudge and declare either of the patents void, in whole or in part, or inoperative or invalid in any particular part of the United States. The difficulty and doubt arise wholly from the phrase "dtie proceedings had according to the course of equity," which seems to have been added to the previous leg- islation, and intended as a limitation upon the remedy, and to conclude the parties to three modes of procedure recognized in equity praetice. �Nothing is more firmly settled in equity than that where a defendant s,eeks the aid of the court for the purpose of en- forcing affirmative rights, he must file a cross-bill, although such a course is not necessary when he relies upon his rights merely as a defence to the relief sought against him. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1550*. �The general rule is that he cannot have any positive relief against the plaintiff, even on the subject-matter of the suit, except by cross-bill. Story, Eq. PL § 398, n. 3; Miller v. ��� �