Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/162

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150 FEDEBAXi BEPOBTSB. �wbereby she acquired the title provided otherwise. Yale v> Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265. �Out of this general power of disposition naturally grew the lesser one— the power to charge her separate estate with a specifie debt or engagement for her own beneflt or that of another. In this way the disability of coverture, as to her separate property, was practically removed ; but her contracta •were still invalid, except so far as they might affect such property, and she is not liable upon them personally, either at law or in equity. Whether a wife has charged her sepa- rate estate with a debt or engagement in a particular case i» a question of evidence, it being the generally-conceded raie thai if the same will ennre to the benefit of herself or her separate estate, that she is presumed to hare intended to sa charge it. But where this is not the effect of the transaction, but the debt or engagement is incurred or made for th& beneot of another, the authorities are in conflict as to the necessary evidence to establish her intention to charge her separate estate therewith. By the English and a major- ity of the American authorities it is held that if a wif& cont act in writng, so as to satisfy the statute of frauds, to pay a sum of moni-y, either as principal or surety, for her own benefit or that of another, it is sufficient evidence of her intention to charge her separate estate, and will create a charge thereon Ihat may be enforced in a court of equity, Bish. Law of M. W. § 870; Bull v, Kellar, 13 B. Mon. 381 ; Deering y. Boyle, 8 Kan. 525; Todd v. Lee, 15 Wis. 401 ; The M. B. of St. Louis V. Taylcrr, 62 Mo. 338 ; Williams v, Win- ston, 9 Eep. 418, (S. C. of Ohio, 1880.) �But in other states, and notably in New York, it is held that the debt or engagement of the wife, the consideration for which does not enure to the benefit of her separate estate, does not create a charge upon said estate, unless her inten- tion to do so is declared in the very contract which is the foundation of the charge. Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 266; S. C. 22 N. Y. 450; S. C. 68 N. Y. 324; Manhattan B. & M. Co. V. Thompson, 58 N. Y. 80 ; The C. E. Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 614. ��� �